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Amy E. Halbrook* 
Under federal and some state laws, juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent for 
sex offenses can be required to register on sex offender registries for extended periods 
or life. In some jurisdictions, lifetime sex offender registration, community notification, 
and other sex offender restrictions are mandatory.  
 
This Article explores whether mandatory lifetime sex offender registration, community 
notification and other sex offender restrictions violate the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee 
against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles. Citing Roper v. Simmons 
and Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Miller v. 
Alabama that assigning mandatory life-without-parole prison sentences to juveniles 
violates the Eighth Amendment because a judge must be allowed to consider mitigating 
circumstances—including a juvenile’s lack of maturity, vulnerability to negative 
influences, and capacity for change—before imposing a lifetime penalty. With Miller, and 
before that Graham, the Court extended the definition of the “most severe” punishments 
to include permanent non-capital punishments applied to juveniles. This reasoning 
should be applied to mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and related restrictions 
as applied to juveniles because they are similarly punitive and permanent penalties. 
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Children’s diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform 
mean that they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.  
—Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 
[O]nly a person protected by legal training from the ordinary way 
people think could say, with a straight face, that this terrible 
consequence of a sex offender’s conviction is not punishment. 
—Sigler v. Ohio, No. 08-CA-79, 2009 WL 1145232, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 27, 2009). 
 
Our juvenile justice system—now more than one hundred years 
old1— differs from the adult criminal justice system in fundamental ways.2 
The most important distinction is that the juvenile justice system’s 
purported primary goal is rehabilitation rather than deterrence, 
incapacitation, or retribution.3 Some scholarship has traced a disturbing 
trend in juvenile justice toward treating some juvenile offenders as adults.4 
In most circumstances, this treatment occurs when both a prosecutor and a 
juvenile court judge determine that the child’s crime is so serious that it 
warrants an adult penalty.5  
 
 1. Our policy of treating juveniles differently from adults goes back to the inception of a 
separate court for juveniles in Chicago in 1899. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile 
Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A Century of 
Juvenile Justice 42, 42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). 
 2. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of treating and rehabilitating 
juveniles rather than “institutionalizing” or “punishing” them as adults. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 15–16 (1967). 
 3. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544–45 n.5 (1971). 
 4. See, e.g., Thomas A. Loughran et al., Differential Effects of Adult Court Transfer on Juvenile 
Offender Recidivism, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 476, 476–77 (2010) (describing policy reforms that led 
more juveniles to be transferred to adult criminal court). 
 5. See, e.g., Ohio’s Juvenile Bindover Procedure Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.12 (West 
2005 & Supp. 2012). 
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When it comes to a broad range of offenses—some serious and 
others comparatively not—that are classified as “sex crimes,”6 certain 
federal and state laws brand young people as societal pariahs, for most or 
the rest of their lives, without regard for their potential for rehabilitation.7 
These reactionary laws, unsupported by science, destroy life outcomes 
for young people who have committed crimes that most of us would not 
believe deserve ostracism without the possibility of review. Society is not 
safer as a result; in fact, it is less safe because these young registrants are 
effectively prohibited from any chance at successfully progressing from 
youth to young adult to productive member of adult society.8 
The Supreme Court recently held in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson 
v. Hobbs (hereinafter jointly referred to as Miller) that mandatory life 
sentences without the possibility of parole constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment as applied to juveniles because a judge must be allowed to 
consider mitigating circumstances (including a juvenile’s lack of maturity, 
vulnerability to negative influences, and capacity for change) before 
imposing a lifetime penalty.9 Miller is the third case in seven years in 
which the Supreme Court acknowledged that juveniles are categorically 
different from adults and should not be subject to the “most severe” 
punishments. These cases changed the standard for the juvenile death 
penalty (Roper v. Simmons),10 juvenile life without parole for non-
homicide crimes (Graham v. Florida),11 and mandatory juvenile life 
without parole (Miller).12 
 
 6. “Sex offense” is defined generally by Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006 (the “Adam Walsh Act”)—also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act (“SORNA”)—as “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact 
with another.” SORNA § 111(5)(A)(i) (42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2006)). “Criminal offense” in the 
relevant sense refers to offenses under any body of criminal law, including state, local, tribal, foreign, 
and military. Id. § 111(6) (42 U.S.C. § 16911(6)). The offenses covered by this clause should be 
understood to include all sexual offenses whose elements involve: (I) any type or degree of genital or 
anal penetration or (II) any sexual touching of or contact with a person’s body, either directly or 
through the clothing. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2246(2)–(3) (2013) (defining sexual act and sexual contact for 
federal laws). 
 7. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290.008 (West 2013); Fla. Stat. §§ 943.0435, 944.607 (2013); 
National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38041–42 
(July 2, 2008) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SORNA Guidelines]. 
 8. Experts report that registries and residency restrictions do not reduce crime. For further 
discussion of this issue, see infra Part I.D. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, An American 
Travesty: Legal Responses to Adolescent Sexual Offending (2004) [hereinafter Zimring, 
Travesty].  
 9. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–69, 2475 (2012) (holding that mandatory life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
 10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the juvenile death penalty 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
 11. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that juvenile life without parole for 
non-homicide crimes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
 12. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69. 
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With Miller and Graham, the Court extended the definition of the 
“most severe” punishments to include permanent non-capital punishments 
as applied to juveniles. Following this evolution, mandatory lifetime sex 
offender registration, community notification, and other sex offender 
restrictions should also be held to be cruel and unusual punishment as 
applied to juveniles because they are similarly punitive and permanent 
penalties. 
Over the past twenty years, legislatures have imposed increasingly 
severe restraints on young people who have been labeled sex offenders,13 
criminalizing behaviors that were once dealt with in communities.14 In spite 
of the traditional rehabilitative goals of juvenile courts, legislatures have 
increasingly saddled juvenile sex offenders with longer registration terms, 
community notification of registry status, and increased restrictions on 
their movement and activities.15 These penalties apply to young people 
who have committed a variety of juvenile offenses, which in some 
jurisdictions include masturbation, sending sexually explicit texts, 
consensual sex acts between teens (“Romeo and Juliet” cases), sexual acts 
within the family, and even some non-sexual offenses.16  
 
 13. See Maggie Jones, How Can You Distinguish a Budding Pedophile from a Kid with Real 
Boundary Problems?, N.Y. Times., July 22, 2007, (Magazine), at 633; see also Ass’n for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers, A Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex Offender Policy to 
Prevent Child Sexual Abuse 21 (2011) [hereinafter ATSA Report 2011] (citing A. Vandervort-
Clark, Legislating Sex Offender Management: Trends in State Litigation in 2007 and 2008, 
Presentation to the 28th Annual Research and Treatment Conference of the Association for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers (Oct. 2009) (“Between 2007 and 2008, no fewer than 1500 sex offender-
related bills were introduced in state legislatures, and over 275 new laws were passed and enacted.”)). 
 14. See, e.g., Fletcher v. State, No. 0404010688, 2008 WL 2912048, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 16, 
2008) (“[In the 1970s] most mothers were stay-at-home mothers, the children were watched after 
school by their mothers, or by other neighborhood mothers. Neighbors knew and socialized with each 
other. The neighborhood mothers were willing to scold any of the neighborhood children when they 
were bad without fearing repercussions from the child’s parents. Those same neighbors were also 
willing to help any of the neighborhood children if they were hurt or in danger. . . . Many of today’s 
children, however, do not have a parent or another neighborhood parent watching over them . . . . The 
solution, unfortunately, and perhaps a necessity to protect the public, has been to greater criminalize 
our children. And the more we have criminalized our children, the easier it has become to simply 
equate them to adults. From 1915 to 2001, Delaware’s juvenile sex offender laws had gone from 
leaving offenses completely to the regulation of family, church, and community, to treating juvenile 
sex offenders just as harshly as adult sex offenders.”). 
 15. As of 2010, thirty-four states required juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses to 
register. Nicole I. Pittman & Quyen Nguyen, A Snapshot of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Laws: A Survey of the United States 32 (2011) [hereinafter Pittman Report]. Of 
those states requiring registration for juvenile offenses, sixteen did not disclose juvenile offenders’ 
private information to the public. Id. Juveniles were subject to lifetime registration in at least seven 
states. Id. 
 16. SORNA, discussed in Part III.B, infra, requires that kidnapping be included as a registerable 
offense. See SORNA § 111(4)(B) (2006) (defining a Tier III sex offender as one whose “offense is 
punishable for more than 1 year” and “involves kidnapping of a minor”). 
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In some jurisdictions, lifetime juvenile sex offender registration is 
mandatory for certain offenses.17 Although this was not always the case, 
some jurisdictions have adopted, or are attempting to adopt, such 
requirements to substantially comply with the federal Adam Walsh Act.18 
This move toward compliance, which is by all means not universal, has 
occurred in spite of inconsistent public support for juveniles being placed 
on registries and questions about the effectiveness of registries in 
promoting public safety.19 
Since jurisdictions began requiring registration, there have been 
challenges to registration requirements for both juveniles and adults.20 
Some courts have held that sex offender registration, community 
notification, and related restrictions are not punitive because they are 
collateral consequences of conviction or adjudication rather than 
punishment.21 However, in recent years, other jurisdictions have held that 
 
 17. See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/2(E)(1); 150/7 (2007) (Illinois’ mandatory lifetime 
registration offenses include, among other things, luring a minor, keeping a place of juvenile 
prostitution, exploitation of a child, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C). 
 18. See SMART: Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, 
Registering, & Tracking, Office of Justice Programs, SORNA, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
smart/sorna.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (listing the states in compliance as Alabama, Delaware, 
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming); see also infra Part III.B. As of November 
2012, there were sixteen states, more than thirty Native American tribes, and three territories in 
substantial compliance with SORNA. See SMART, supra; see also Nicole I. Pittman, Address at Nat’l 
Jewish Democratic Council Leadership Summit: Litigation Approaches to Challenging SORNA (Oct. 
26, 2012) [hereinafter Pittman Presentation]. 
 19. Recent studies have looked at public support for juvenile registry. See, e.g., Poco D. 
Kernsmith et al., Public Attitudes Toward Sexual Offenders and Sex Offender Registration, 18 J. Child 
Sexual Abuse 290, 294 (2009) (reporting that eighty-six percent of participants in the study believed 
that a juvenile who committed a forcible sex offense should be required to register, but the juvenile 
was less worthy of having registration imposed than adults who sexually abused children); Jessica M. 
Salerno et al., Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Support for Juvenile Sex Offender Registry Laws: 
Prototypes, Moral Outrage, and Perceived Threat, 28 Behav. Sci. & L. 58, 79 (2010) (“In the abstract, 
the public is as likely to support registry laws for juvenile as for adult sex offenders, but when faced 
with a particularly young juvenile, or a juvenile whose offenses are less severe than the prototypically 
severe sex offense that people naturally envision, people are less likely to support registry laws for 
juveniles.”); Margaret C. Stevenson et al., Effects of Defendant and Victim Race on Perceptions of 
Juvenile Sex Offenders, 27 Behav. Sci. & L. 957, 962, 967 (2009) (studying support for requiring a 
fifteen-year-old boy to register in a case involving statutory rape; study participants supported 
registration so long as the boy’s identifying information was not disseminated on the internet). 
 20. See infra notes 21, 22, 25. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male III”), 670 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the requirement that juvenile sex offenders register in a database is not cruel and 
unusual punishment); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 760 (Ill. 2003) (holding that lifetime juvenile sex 
offender registration did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment post-Roper, partially because 
juveniles’ registration information is not publicly disseminated); see also ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 
670 F.3d 1046, 1060 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that due process is not violated because registration and 
notification requirements are imposed as the result of being convicted). 
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juvenile sex offender registration, especially when coupled with a 
community notification requirement, is unconstitutionally punitive.22 
Some jurisdictions have refused to implement registration schemes for 
juveniles because they conflict with juvenile justice policy, in particular 
the policy of keeping juvenile adjudications confidential.23 This trend 
takes into account current thinking about juveniles’ reduced culpability 
and capacity for change.24 
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of 
whether juvenile sex offender registration constitutes punishment. It has, 
however, held that adult offender registration does not constitute 
punishment, partially because an adult’s public registry information is 
already a matter of public record due to the adult’s criminal conviction.25 
That reasoning should not be applicable to juveniles, because juvenile 
court files are traditionally confidential.26 In addition, applying mandatory 
lifetime sex offender restrictions to juveniles without the possibility for 
meaningful review fails to recognize that youth are categorically different, 
that they should not be subject to the “most severe” punishments, or that 
registration and community notification undermine the primary goal of the 
juvenile justice system: rehabilitation.27 
This Article explores whether laws requiring mandatory lifetime 
registration, community notification, and other restrictions based on 
 
 22. See, e.g., People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (holding ten year 
juvenile sex offender registration requirement cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a Romeo 
and Juliet case); In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 750 (Ohio 2012) (holding that mandatory lifetime sex 
offender registration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and recognizing a national consensus 
on the issue). 
 23. States refusing to comply include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Nebraska, and Texas. The 
Adam Walsh Act: States in “Substantial Compliance” Very Low?, Congress, Courts and Decisions 
(July 27, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://congress-courts-legislation.blogspot.com/2011/07/adam-walsh-act-
states-in-substantial.html. 
 24. Dealing with Child-on-Child Sex Abuse Not One Size Fits All, USAToday.com (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-07/child-sex-abuse/52431616/1. 
 25. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (noting that any stigma related to sex offender 
registration was not punishment, as it was not an “integral part of the objective of the regulatory 
scheme”). This Article argues, however, that the reasoning applied in Smith is inapplicable because it 
applied to adults, not juveniles who are categorically different. 
 26. See, e.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/1–8 (2007); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.17 (2013); Ohio. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.14 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male 
I”), 590 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) (“Juveniles are denied certain 
procedural rights afforded to adult criminal defendants . . . but they are, in turn, beneficiaries of an 
adjudicatory system designed, though not always successfully, to rehabilitate rather than punish—a 
system ill-suited to public exposure.”). 
 27. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–69, 2475 (2012); see, e.g., Illinois Juvenile Court 
Act, 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/5–101 (one purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is “[t]o provide an 
individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate 
and to prevent further delinquent behavior though the development of competency in the juvenile 
offender”). 
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juvenile sex offender status violate the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Part I describes current social 
science and developmental research related to juvenile sex offenders, 
including re-offense rates and effectiveness of treatment. Part II discusses 
the effects of registration, community notification, and other related 
restrictions and why they constitute punishment as applied to juveniles. 
Part III describes the history and current status of sex offender 
registration, community notification, and other restrictions on juveniles. 
Part IV discusses relevant case law related to the punitive nature of sex 
offender registration and the cruel and unusual nature of mandatory 
lifetime penalties for juveniles. Part V applies an Eighth Amendment 
analysis to mandatory lifetime registration, community notification, and 
restrictions on juveniles convicted of sex offenses and argues that such 
requirements constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Part VI 
recommends how to proceed toward building a national consensus that 
imposing mandatory lifetime sex offender registration constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles, and ultimately toward 
abolishing the practice. 
I.  What Research Tells Us About Juvenile Sex Offenders and 
Registration 
A. Adolescent Brain Development Generally 
Our understanding of juvenile sex offenders must be rooted in an 
understanding of adolescent development generally. A wealth of new 
information about adolescent brain development has emerged since 
states began imposing sex offender registration requirements.28 This new 
information helps us to put juvenile sex offending in context. 
Adolescents are not as mentally or emotionally developed as adults.29 
Brain development research shows that juveniles’ prefrontal cortexes (the 
 
 28. The federal guidelines for implementation of the Jacob Wetterling Act (enacted in 1994, 
requiring all states to implement sex offender registries) did not require states to register juveniles for 
sex offenses, but did not prohibit them from doing so. See Megan’s Law: Final Guidelines for the 
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 572, 578 (Jan. 5, 1999) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071). Many states began imposing 
registration requirements on juveniles thereafter. For a snapshot of states requiring juvenile 
registration, see Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 33. 
 29. See generally Mario Beauregard et al., Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of 
Emotion, 21 J. Neuroscience RC165 (2001); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity 
of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 
741 (2000); Robert F. McGivern et al., Cognitive Efficiency on a Match to Sample Task Decreases at the 
Onset of Puberty in Children, 50 Brain & Cognition 73 (2002); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping 
Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span, 6 Nature Neuroscience 309 (2003); Elizabeth R. 
Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 
2 Nature Neuroscience 859 (1999); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral 
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part of the brain primarily responsible for judgment and impulse control) 
are less effective than those of adults.30 The prefrontal cortex does not 
normally develop until an individual reaches her twenties.31 Adolescent 
brains have high levels of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex, which 
increases the likelihood of engaging in risky or “novelty-seeking” 
behavior.32 In addition to the prefrontal cortex, juveniles’ limbic systems—
responsible for emotional and reward-seeking behaviors—are more active 
than those of adults.33 Adolescents place less weight on risk than adults34 
and are “vulnerab[le] to risky behavior, because sensation-seeking is high 
and self-regulation is still immature.”35 As a result, adolescents are more 
likely than adults to take risks and make poor decisions.36 
In addition to issues related to prefrontal cortexes and limbic systems, 
the white matter in the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed.37 This 
impedes that part of the brain that handles judgment and decision-
making—the prefrontal cortex—from effectively communicating with the 
part that controls emotions and thrill seeking.38 As an adolescent matures, 
the white matter increases in the brain through the process of myelination, 
and information processing improves.39 At the same time, gray matter in 
the brain, which causes information processing inefficiencies, is pruned 
away.40 Simply put, the part of the teen brain that is responsible for 
judgment and impulse control and the part of the brain that controls 
 
Manifestations, 24 Neuroscience & Biobehav. Revs. 417 (2000); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, 
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009 (2003). 
 30. See Alison S. Burke, Under Construction, 34 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 381, 383 (2011) (noting 
that sections of the brain mature into the early twenties); Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist 
Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 Brain & Cognition 160, 161–62 (2010) 
(noting that the prefrontal cortex is the last part of the brain to mature). 
 31. See Burke, supra note 30, at 383. 
 32. Dustin Wahlstrom et al., Developmental Changes in Dopamine Neurotransmission in 
Adolescence, 72 Brain & Cognition 146, 152 (2010). 
 33. Todd A. Hare et al., Biological Substrates of Emotional Reactivity and Regulation in 
Adolescence During an Emotional Go-Nogo Task, 63 Biological Psychiatry 927, 932 (2008) (noting 
that when compared to adults, adolescents place less weight on risk than reward). 
 34. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 29, at 1012. 
 35. Steinberg, supra note 30, at 162 (“[M]any risky behaviors follow this pattern, including 
unprotected sex.”). 
 36. Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 
12 Developmental Rev. 339, 344 (1992) (“[R]eckless behavior [is] virtually a normative characteristic 
of adolescent development.”); see Adolescent Brains Show Lower Activity in Areas that Control Risky 
Choices, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-
news/2007/adolescent-brains-show-lower-activity-in-areas-that-control-risky-choices.shtml. 
 37. Steinberg, supra note 30, at 161. 
 38. Antoinette Kavanaugh, Enhancing Juvenile Representation: A Developmentally Sound 
Approach, slide 10 (Jan. 5, 2012) (available from the author). 
 39. Id. at slide 11. 
 40. Id. 
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emotions and reward seeking become better able to communicate as a 
teen matures; as this communication improves, youths become better 
decisionmakers.41 
In addition to the neurological, adolescents are not fully developed 
in the psychosocial realm.42 The most extreme increase in psychosocial 
development occurs between ages sixteen and nineteen.43 As they 
develop psychosocial competencies, juveniles increase their “capacity to 
resist the pull of social and emotional influences and remain focused on 
long-term goals.”44 Until early adulthood, young people lack the ability to 
efficiently process social and emotional cues, leading to increased 
susceptibility to outside negative influences.45 Juveniles are especially 
susceptible to peer influences46 and are more likely to engage in “antisocial 
behavior” to conform to peer expectations or build status in a group.47 
This relatively new information has influenced how courts, including 
the Supreme Court, understand juveniles generally: 
[T]his Court has . . . observed that children generally are less mature 
and responsible than adults; that they often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them; that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . 
outside pressures than adults. . . . The law has historically reflected the 
same assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to 
exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to 
understand the world around them.48 
It is important to remember this perspective on normal adolescent 
development and culpability with regard to juveniles who commit sex 
offenses. Like other offenses, a juvenile’s sex offenses often reflect 
immature decisionmaking, sensation seeking, and responses to peer 
pressure.49 
 
 41. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density 
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 
21 J. Neuroscience 8819, 8826–28 (2001) (noting that as gray matter is pruned, adult judgment and 
decisionmaking emerge). 
 42. See Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 
21 J. Res. on Adolescence 211, 216–20 (2011). 
 43. Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 29, at 756. 
 44. See Albert & Steinberg, supra note 42, at 220. 
 45. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public 
Policy?, 64 Am. Psychologist 739, 743 (2009). 
 46. See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, 
and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 
41 Developmental Psychol. 625, 625 (2005). 
 47. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 626, 633. 
 48. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 49. See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/2 (2007 & Supp. 2012) (including grabbing, masturbation, or 
public urination as registerable criminal sexual abuse offenses). 
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B. Who Are Juvenile Sex Offenders? 
Our collective image of sex offenders frequently does not comport 
with what research tells us about juveniles who commit sex crimes.50 
Much of our collective fear of juvenile sex offenders is rooted in 
misconception.51 Although we deeply fear predatory sexual crime and 
associate it with the words “sex offender,” research shows that juveniles 
tend to commit non-predatory offenses and offenses of curiosity, against 
the people they know—other young people.52 Juveniles generally engage 
in less serious sexual offenses than adults53 and have fewer victims than 
adult sex offenders.54 Juveniles who commit offenses against other 
juveniles are not considered pedophiles.55 As a group, juveniles who are 
adjudicated delinquent have low rates of sexual re-offense and an even 
lower likelihood of sexually offending as adults, especially if they receive 
appropriate treatment.56 They are far more likely than adult offenders to 
 
 50. I had the opportunity to talk to many people—students, professors, and the public—about 
youth on registries when I worked as a clinic fellow in the Children and Family Justice Center at 
Northwestern University School of Law in 2010 and 2011. As part of that work, I sometimes 
conducted an activity where I asked my audience to complete the following sentence: “A juvenile sex 
offender is . . . .” When asked to complete the sentence “A juvenile sex offender is . . .” respondents replied, 
among other things, “nasty,” “sick,” “needs help,” “abused as children,” “dysfunctional relationship with 
parents,” “someone who follows you and wants to harm you,” “child predators,” “rapists,” and “dangerous.” 
(on file with Author).  
 51. False assumptions include: that there is an epidemic of juvenile sex offending, that juvenile 
sex offenders have more in common with adult sex offenders than with other juvenile delinquents, and 
that juvenile sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending. Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Do Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Requirements Deter Juvenile Sex Crimes?, 37 Crim. Just. & 
Behav. 553, 565–66 (2010). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See, e.g., Sue Righthand & Carlann Welch, Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency 
Prevention, Juveniles Who Have Sexually Offended: A Review of the Professional Literature 
57 (2001) (concluding that youth engage in fewer inappropriate behaviors over a shorter duration and 
that their behaviors are less aggressive); Phoebe Greer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex 
Offender Registration, 27 Dev. Mental Health L. 33, 44–46 (2008) (documenting juvenile sex offenses 
that are generally not abusive or aggressive in nature); Alexis O. Miranda & Colette L. Corcoran, 
Comparison of Perpetration Characteristics Between Male Juvenile and Adult Sexual Offenders, 
12 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 179, 179, 184, 186 (2000) (studying characteristics of sixteen 
juvenile and nineteen adult males who had committed sexual abuse and found that adult offenders 
committed a higher number of perpetrator incidents and had longer relationships with their victims). 
 54. Miranda & Corcoran, supra note 53, at 186. 
 55. See John A. Hunter Jr. et al., The Relationship Between Phallometrically Measured Deviant 
Sexual Arousal and Clinical Characteristics in Juvenile Sexual Offenders, 32 Behav. Res. & Therapy 
533, 537–38 (1994). 
 56. See Terance D. Meithe et al., Specialization and Persistence in the Arrest Histories of Sex 
Offenders: A Comparative Analysis of Alternative Measures and Offense Types, 43 J. Res. Crime & 
Delinq. 204, 222 (2006); Michelle L. Meloy, The Sex Offender Next Door: An Analysis of Recidivism, 
Risk Factors, and Deterrence of Sex Offenders on Probation, 16 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 211, 225–26 
(2005); Donna M. Vandiver, A Prospective Analysis of Juvenile Male Sex Offenders: Characteristics 
and Recidivism Rates as Adults, 21 J. Interpersonal Violence 673, 685 (2006); Dennis Waite et al., 
Juvenile Sex Offender Re-arrest Rates for Sexual, Violent Nonsexual and Property Crimes: A Ten-Year 
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stop inappropriate sexual behaviors with intervention.57 In sum, research 
shows that juveniles who commit sex offenses are clinically different 
from adults who commit sex offenses.58 
C. Juvenile Sex Offenders and Treatment 
Many juveniles end up on sex offender registries for behaviors that 
would be considered within the spectrum of normal sexual 
development.59 However, some others end up on registries for activities 
that fall outside the spectrum of average sexual development.60 
Research indicates that most juveniles who commit sex offenses will 
outgrow the behavior, especially if they receive appropriate treatment.61 
Effective juvenile sex offender treatment addresses a young person’s risk 
factors for, and protective factors against, reoffending.62 Risk factors may 
include poor coping skills, low self-esteem, sexual attraction or sexual 
preoccupation, difficulty maintaining intimate relationships, chaotic home 
environment, and lack of peer network or community presence.63 Risk 
must be balanced against protective factors against offending, which may 
include emotional expressiveness, a strong desire not to harm others, a 
strong sense of self, the ability to self-soothe, regular school attendance, 
social and emotional adjustment, and caregiver stability and support.64 
 
Follow Up, 17 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 313, 313 (2005); Franklin E. Zimring et al., Sexual 
Delinquency in Racine: Does Early Sex Offending Predict Later Sex Offending in Youth and Young 
Adulthood?, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 507, 529 (2007) [hereinafter Zimring et al., Racine]. 
 57. See ATSA Report 2011, supra note 13, at 15 (citing David Finkelhor et al., Office of 
Juvenile Justice & Delinquency, Juveniles Who Commit Sex Offenses Against Minors, Juvenile 
Justice Bulletin (2009)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Recent statistics indicate that forty-eight percent of high school students have had sexual 
intercourse; of sexually active high school students, fifteen percent have had four or more sexual 
partners. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 2007 Results: Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance 
System: Sexual Behaviors, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/youthonline/App/QuestionsOrLocations.aspx 
(follow “Ever had sexual intercourse” hyperlink; follow “Had sexual intercourse with four or more 
persons” hyperlink). Similar results were reported for 2011. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, supra (reporting 47.4% of students have had sexual intercourse and 15.3% with four or 
more partners). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ass’n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, The Effective Legal Management of 
Juvenile Sex Offenders 2 (Mar. 11, 2000) (arguing that because their brains are developing, juveniles 
are more amenable to appropriate and effective treatment than adults). 
 62. Id. at 4–5. 
 63. See generally id.; Gregory A. Parks & David E. Bard, Risk Factors for Adolescent Sex 
Offender Recidivism: Evaluation of Predictive Factors and Comparison of Three Groups Based Upon 
Victim Type, 18 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 319 (2006) (reporting that results of retrospective 
risk assessments showed certain factors as predictors of sexual and non-sexual recidivism, and support 
previous research that most juveniles do not continue offending into adulthood). 
 64. ATSA Report 2011, supra note 13, at 17 (citing Jane Gilgun, Children and Adolescents With 
Problematic Sexual Behaviors, in Current Perspectives: Working With Sexually Aggressive 
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Helping youth develop protective factors is a critical piece in the 
effectiveness of treatment.65 
Juvenile sex offenders are generally responsive to treatment66— 
more so than adults—because of their youth and developmental status.67 
With effective treatment, they are more likely than not to “stop their 
abusive behaviors and live safely in the community,”68 and are less likely 
to commit either sexual re-offenses or non-sexual offenses.69 
D. Re-Offense and Recidivism 
While the public is concerned that juvenile sex offenders are likely 
to become habitual sexual predators or commit violent offenses as adults, 
that fear is not generally realized—and should have been dispelled—by 
recent research on sexual re-offense and general recidivism rates among 
youth adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses. 
This research shows that juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sex 
offenses have extremely low rates of recidivism generally and even lower 
rates of sexual re-offense.70 Several recent longitudinal studies, examining 
data on more than 33,000 juvenile sex offenders, reinforce the clinical 
consensus that juvenile sex offenders present low recidivism risks.71 
 
Youth and Youth With Sexual Behavior Problems 383 (Robert E. Longo & David S. Prescott eds., 
2006); Janis Bremer, Protective Factors Scale, in Risk Assessment of Youth Who Have Sexually 
Abused 195 (David Prescott ed., 2006)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Nat’l Ctr. on Sexual Behavior of Youth, NCSBY Fact Sheet: What Research Shows 
About Adolescent Sex Offenders 1 (2003), http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/ca/NCSBYfactsheet.pdf; see 
Timothy E. Wind, The Quandry of Megan’s Law: When the Child Sex Offender is a Child, 37 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 73, 105 (2003) (noting that when treated in programs designed for juvenile sex 
offenders, youth who receive treatment recidivate at lower rates than treated adults and untreated 
juveniles). 
 67. ATSA Report 2011, supra note 13, at 13. 
 68. Id. at 15 (citing David Finkelhor & Lisa M. Jones, Office of Juvenile Justice & 
Delinquency, Explanations for the Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Juvenile Justice Bull. 8–10 
(2004)); see Parks & Bard, supra note 63, at 337 (finding that juvenile sex offenders who completed 
treatment had recidivism of 5.3%, compared to 17.8% for those who did not). 
 69. Marc Winokur et al., Juvenile Sexual Offender Research: A Systematic Review of 
Evidence-Based Research 19–21 (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., Michael F. Caldwell et al., An Examination of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act as Applied to Juveniles: Evaluating the Ability to Predict Sexual Recidivism, 
14 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 89, 101 (2008); Michael F. Caldwell, Sexual Offense Adjudication and 
Sexual Recidivism Among Juvenile Offenders, 19 Sex Abuse 107, 107 (2007) [hereinafter Caldwell, 
Sexual Offense Adjudication]; Elizabeth J. Letourneau & Kevin S. Armstrong, Recidivism Rates for 
Registered and Nonregistered Juvenile Sex Offenders, 20 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 393, 403 
(2008); Zimring et al., Racine, supra note 56, at 522; Franklin E. Zimring et al., Investigating the 
Continuity of Sex Offending: Evidence from the Second Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study, 26 Just. Q. 
58, 58 (2009) [hereinafter Zimring et al., Philadelphia]. 
 71. See id. 
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1. Zimring Studies 
In 2006 and 2007, Franklin Zimring and his associates studied two 
large community-based samples of male and female birth cohorts to 
examine the risk of recidivism among people adjudicated delinquent for 
sex offenses.72 Both studies show that juvenile sex offenders pose little 
risk of recidivism, especially in adulthood.73 
In the first study, Zimring and his colleagues examined patterns of 
juvenile-to-adult sex offending. The study examined data from three birth 
cohorts in Racine, Wisconsin, of youth born in 1942, 1949, and 1955.74 The 
population consisted of more than 6000 boys and girls.75 Based on the data 
collected, the researchers found minimal correlation between committing a 
sex offense as a juvenile and committing a sex offense as an adult.76 Only 
8.5% of males with juvenile sex offense police contact had such police 
contact as adults.77 In comparison, 6.2% of males with juvenile non-sex 
offense police contact had adult sex offense police contact.78 As juvenile 
sex offenders were not statistically more likely than juvenile non-sex 
offenders to commit an adult sex offense, the researchers found that 
juvenile sex offending did not predict adult sex offending.79 
In the next study, Zimring and his colleagues examined data from 
the 1958 Second Philadelphia Birth Cohort to again examine juvenile-to-
adult sex offending.80 The data included information about 13,160 males 
and 14,000 females from birth to age twenty-six.81 A total of 204 males 
and seventeen females had police contacts for sex offenses as juveniles;82 
of these 221 individuals, one in ten males and zero females had a sex-
related offense during the first eight years of adulthood.83 The 
researchers concluded that neither having committed a sex offense as a 
juvenile nor the frequency of juvenile sex offending significantly 
increased the likelihood that a person would commit a sex offense as an 
adult.84 Further, the results indicated that a history of juvenile sex 
 
 72. See Zimring et al., Racine, supra note 56, at 507; Zimring et al., Philadelphia, supra note 70, at 59. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Zimring et al., Racine, supra note 56, at 511. 
 75. Id. at 512. 
 76. Id. at 526. 
 77. Id. at 508. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 529. 
 80. Zimring et al., Philadelphia, supra note 70, at 59. 
 81. Id. at 62. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 65. 
 84. Id. at 69. 
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offending contributed virtually nothing to predicting membership in any 
adult offender group, particularly in an adult sex offender group.85 
2. Caldwell Study 
At about the same time, Michael Caldwell studied the recidivism 
patterns of a cohort of more than 2,000 juveniles who were released from 
secure custody.86 A total of 249 had committed sex offenses and 1780 had 
committed non-sex offenses.87 During a five-year period, the prevalence 
of new sex offenses for those previously adjudicated for sex offenses was 
6.8%, compared to 5.7% for those previously adjudicated for non-sex 
offenses.88 In the five-year follow-up period, eighty-five percent of the 
new sexual offenses were committed by previously non-sex offending 
juveniles.89 
3. Letourneau Studies 
In both 2008 and 2009, Elizabeth Letourneau and her colleagues 
studied juvenile sex offenders in South Carolina and found that sex 
offender registration had no effect on juvenile sexual or non-sexual re-
offending.90 In the 2008 study, nonregistered youth were matched with 
registered youth (111 matched pairs) on the basis of year of index 
offense, age at index offense, race, prior person offenses, prior 
nonperson offenses, and type of index sexual offense.91 Recidivism was 
assessed across a four-year follow-up.92 The results showed that the 
sexual offense reconviction rate was less than one percent—too low to 
support a comparison between the groups.93 Non-sexual violent offense 
reconviction rates did not significantly differ between registered and 
nonregistered juveniles.94 
In the 2009 study, Letourneau and her colleagues studied recidivism 
rates of males with sex crime adjudications for an average nine-year 
follow-up period.95 The results showed that the sexual offense reconviction 
rate was less than three percent, and registration had no influence on non-
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Caldwell, Sexual Offense Adjudication, supra note 70, at 107. 
 87. Id. at 107. 
 88. Id. at 110. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Letourneau & Armstrong, supra note 70, at 393–408. 
 91. Id. at 398. 
 92. Id. at 393. 
 93. Id. at 399–400. 
 94. Id. at 393. 
 95. Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration on Juvenile Sexual 
Recidivism, 20 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 136, 136 (2009). 
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sexual violent recidivism.96 Several other studies on the same subject 
confirm these results.97 
4. Registries and Public Safety 
Registration laws and other restrictions on juvenile sex offenders do 
not achieve their intended purpose of improving public safety. 
Registries have not been shown to deter sex offending98 or to reduce 
crime.99 Many researchers and criminal justice reformers have argued 
that registries make communities less safe because they generate a false 
sense of security.100 Registries instill the belief that parents can protect 
their children from sexual offenders by checking an online database.101 
However, the majority of juvenile sex offenses involve people that they 
know intimately—members of their families and their juvenile peers.102 
Placing juveniles on registries does not affect their ability to offend 
against those populations. 
In addition, registries may actually increase crime by alienating 
juvenile registrants from social supports and institutions (including 
education, housing, employment, and family) that reduce the risk of 
delinquent behaviors.103 Registration can make it difficult for a youth to 
progress through school and participate in extracurricular activities or 
participate in other social institutions.104 Public registration and community 
notification can impede brain development,105 increase the risk of suicide, 
alienate a youth from school and community, and raise barriers to 
 
 96. Id. at 142. 
 97. See, e.g., Meloy, supra note 56, at 211 (2005); James R. Worling & Tracey Curwen, Adolescent 
Sexual Offender Recidivism: Success of Specialized Treatment and Implications for Risk Prediction, 
24 Child Abuse & Neglect 965, 965 (2000) (describing a ten-year follow-up study of adolescents who 
had sexually offended); James R. Worling et al., 20-Year Prospective Follow-Up Study of Specialized 
Treatment for Adolescents Who Offend Sexually, 28 Behav. Sci. & L. 46, 47 (2010) (showing that 
adolescents who participated in specialized treatment were significantly less likely to face charges for 
sexual, non-sexual violent, and nonviolent crimes). 
 98. Letourneau et al., supra note 51, at 553. 
 99. See Zimring, Travesty, supra note 8, at 149. 
 100. Sarah Tofte, Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf. 
 101. Seventy percent of mental health professionals surveyed felt that “a listing of sex offenders on 
the web would create a false sense of security for parents who might feel that they can protect their 
children simply by checking a web site.” Alvin Malesky & Jeanmarie Keim, Mental Health 
Professionals’ Perspectives on Sex Offender Registry Web Sites, 13 Sexual Abuse: J. Res. & Treatment 
53, 53 (2001). 
 102. Justice Policy Inst., Registering Harm: How Sex Offense Registries Fail Youth and 
Communities 13 (2008). 
 103. Cf. Zimring et al., Racine, supra note 56, at 530. 
 104. Id. (stating that youth labeled as sex offenders often experience social rejection, making them 
more likely to associate with delinquent peers, less likely to be attached to social institutions such as 
schools and churches, and ultimately more likely to engage in illegal behaviors). 
 105. Id. 
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successful participation in society.106 Moreover, registries are often out of 
date. inaccurate, or both, which causes misdirected fear and ostracism of 
people who live at an address listed on the internet, but who have never 
committed a sex crime.107 
Reformers have argued that establishing and maintaining registries 
unnecessarily costs law enforcement money and resources because 
officers are forced to spend time tracking down people who fail to 
register, many of whom pose no threat to the public.108 In addition, they 
have argued that blanket registration and notification requirements 
make it difficult for the public to accurately assess safety threats.109 
Moreover, they have argued that suspicion caused by registries and 
notification may undermine a community’s sense of trust which, in turn, 
inhibits communities from facilitating public controls—like community 
watches—that increase public safety.110 
II.  Social Science Related to the Punitive Nature of 
Registration, Notification, and Restrictions on Juveniles 
Juveniles on sex offender registries face severe and often permanent 
penalties.111 For the juvenile, registration may affect participation in school, 
college, and an orderly, social, daily life.112 Humiliation and shame 
associated with registry status, and the risk of being exposed, often serve to 
isolate young people on registries.113 Housing and job instability are also 
key problems that can undermine a juvenile’s ability to develop 
appropriately.114 Many young people on registries are restricted from 
 
 106. Tofte, supra note 100, at 80–97. 
 107. Richard Tewksbury & Matthew B. Lees, Perceptions of Punishment: How Registered Sex 
Offenders View Registries, 53 Crime & Delinq. 380, 384 (2007). 
 108. See Zimring, Travesty, supra note 8, at 146. 
 109. See Jill S. Levenson & David A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual 
Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 168, 182 (2007). 
 110. See Zimring, Travesty, supra note 8, at 146. (citing Jeffrey Michael Cancino, The Utility of 
Social Capital and Collective Efficacy: Social Control Policy in Nonmetropolitan Settings, 16 Crim. 
Just. Pol’y Rev. 287 (2005)). 
 111. Michael F. Caldwell, What We Do Not Know About Juvenile Sexual Reoffense Risk, 7 Child 
Maltreatment 291, 301 (2002) (outlining negative consequences of registration on juveniles). For 
example, Louisiana requires sex offender status to be printed on driver’s license. See, e.g., La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 15:542 (2012). 
 112. Caldwell, supra note 111, at 301. 
 113. See generally Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-
Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 163 (2003). 
 114. See, e.g., Ava Page et al., Justice Policy Inst., Education and Public Safety 9 (2007); 
Tofte, supra note 100, at 80–97 (stating that juvenile registration increases suicide risk, alienation from 
school and community, and increases barriers to successful community participation); Robert G. 
Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Managing High Risk Criminals or 
Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 375, 376 (2000); Zimring et al., Racine, supra note 
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participating in age-appropriate activities or living near children, which can 
lead to social isolation that may increase risky delinquent or criminal 
behavior.115 Research also shows that some of these outcomes affect a 
former offender’s ability to rehabilitate and reintegrate into society.116 
This is especially troubling given that a recent study of three-hundred 
young people on sex offender registries showed that 85.6% had waived 
trial for an offense that required registration and 53.1% reported they 
were not told that sex offender registration would be part of their 
sentence.117 In addition, 87% of these young people reported that the 
public was notified of their registry status, despite the fact that only 
67.9% were subject to public registration.118 
In states with community notification requirements, community 
members sometimes use registry information to harass, victimize, or 
discriminate against sex offenders.119 People on registries often want to 
hide their registry status to avoid discrimination and harassment120 and 
tend to isolate themselves after being exposed or victimized.121 
This is not only the youth’s problem. A juvenile’s registration status 
often affects the whole family because children live within family units.122 
The majority of people on registries feel that their stigma attaches to 
 
56, at 530 (stating that youth labeled as sex offenders are less likely to be attached to positive 
institutions like schools or churches.). 
 115. See Richard Tewksbury, Experiences and Attitudes of Registered Female Sex Offenders, 
68 Fed. Probation 30, 31 (2004); see also Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex 
Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 Analyses Soc. Issues & Pub. Pol’y 1, 3 (2007) 
(explaining that when communities are aware a person is on the sex offender registry, the offender 
may be subject to harassment, vigilantism, stress, depression, employment instability, housing 
instability, all of which increase the likelihood of criminal behavior). 
 116. See Elizabeth E. Mustaine et al., Residential Location and Mobility of Registered Sex 
Offenders, 30 Am. J. Crim. Just. 177, 190 (2006); Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex 
Offender Registration, 21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 67, 68 (2005) [hereinafter Tewksbury, Collateral 
Consequences]; Tewksbury, supra note 115, at 31; Richard Tewksbury & Matthew Lees, Perceptions of 
Sex Offender Registration: Collateral Consequences and Community Experiences, 26 Soc. Spectrum 
309, 331–32 (2006). 
 117. Pittman Presentation, supra note 18. 
 118. Examples of public notification included personal information and photograph on the 
internet (84.6%), school notification (22%), employer notification (26.4%), highway billboard sign 
(1.3%), and flyers (18.7%). Id. 
 119. Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences, supra note 116, at 68. 
 120. Id. at 75. 
 121. Id. at 78–79. 
 122. William Edwards & Christopher Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender Management 
Legislation Policy: Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community Notification Laws, 
45 Int’l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 83, 91 (2001) (stating that sex offender 
management places a strain on the entire family, not just the registrant); Nastassia Walsh & Tracy 
Velazquez, Registering Harm: The Adam Walsh Act and Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, Champion, 
Dec. 2009, at 20, 22–23 (highlighting the challenges juvenile sex offender registrants face). 
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their entire families.123 Families of registrants face isolation, threats, 
harassment, stress, and housing displacement.124 
Perhaps the most compelling descriptions of the problem come from 
youth registrants themselves. Young registrants interviewed for a Human 
Rights Watch Report on the impact of sex offender registration laws on 
children reported that registration affected them in the following ways: 
denial of access to or severely interrupted primary or secondary education 
(52.4%); homelessness (44.6%); serious repercussions for families 
including economic hardship and strained family relationships (76.7%); 
exposure to violence or threats of violence against self or family member 
(52%); attempted suicide (19.6%); negative psychological impacts on self 
or family member (84.5%).125 
Reflecting current social science, many courts have recognized that 
registries and community notification shame and isolate registrants.126 
Branding, shaming, and banishment are historical punishments that have 
been held to constitute excessive punishment.127 There is no consensus as to 
whether registries and community notification of juvenile sex offender status 
brand, shame, and banish to the extent that they constitute punishment 
excessive or otherwise, but some courts have so held.128 
III.  Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Legal Landscape 
A. Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, Notification, and 
Restrictions Before 2006 
Sex offender registration statutes require people convicted of sex 
offenses to provide personal information to law enforcement agencies.129 
Generally, the articulated purpose of registries is to monitor offenders, to 
 
 123. Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 
21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 49, 52 (2005). 
 124. See Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences, supra note 116, at 79. 
 125. See Nicole Pittman & Alison Parker, Human Rights Watch, Raised on the Registry: The 
Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex Offender Registries in the U.S. 50–72 (2013). 
 126. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (reasoning that registration 
as a sex offender carries with it “shame, humiliation, ostracism, loss of employment . . . and a 
multitude of other adverse consequences” that result in a “tangible impairment of a right in addition 
to the harm to reputation,” thereby implicating a liberty interest); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 420 
(N.J. 1995) (construing New Jersey’s sex offender registration statute and holding that harm to 
reputation coupled with harm to the Constitutional right to privacy implicates a federally protected 
Constitutional interest); cf. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that inclusion 
on child abuse registry implicates liberty right to future employment). 
 127. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1250–51 
(10th Cir. 2000); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir. 1999); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 
1077, 1099 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 128. See, e.g., In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012). 
 129. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 21, 28, & 42 U.S.C.). 
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locate suspects when new sex crimes take place, and to restrict sex 
offenders’ residency and employment options in order to protect the 
public safety.130 Community notification statutes allow for publication or 
dissemination of a registrant’s personal identifying information to law 
enforcement agencies, interested parties, or the public.131 
In the 1990s, Congress enacted several statutes that provided financial 
incentives for states that implemented sex offender registries.132 In 1994, 
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offenders Registration Act (the “Jacob Wetterling Act”) required 
registration for many sexual offenses against children and some non-sexual 
offenses, including kidnapping and false imprisonment of a minor.133 The 
Jacob Wetterling Act required states “to track sex offenders by confirming 
their place of residence annually for ten years after their release into the 
community or quarterly for the rest of their lives if the sex offender was 
convicted of a violent sex crime.”134 The Jacob Wetterling Act allowed for, 
but did not require, community notification.135 Megan’s Law, enacted in 
1996, amended the Jacob Wetterling Act to require law enforcement to 
notify the community when “necessary to protect the public.”136 In the 
same year, the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification 
Act of 1996 created a federal database of all the registration information 
and made it available to federal and local law enforcement.137 In 2000, 
Congress passed the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, which required 
sex offenders to report enrollment in or employment at an institution of 
higher education.138 
By the mid-1990s, almost every state had enacted some form of sex 
offender registry and community notification in order to obtain its share of 
federal crime protection funds.139 The federal laws did not specify whether 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. The federal Adam Walsh Act allows the public to seek information about specific registrants 
“in order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children.” Id. 
 132. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1995) (encouraging states to come into compliance with the Act; 
refusal meant losing ten percent of federal law enforcement funds under the Byrne Grant Program of 
the Department of Justice). 
 133. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(A). 
 134. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violence Offender Registration Act 
of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. § 170101(b)(6) (2d Sess. 1994) (repealed 2006) (“Jacob Wetterling 
Act”); see Jane L. Ireland et al., Violent and Sexual Offenders: Assessment, Treatment, and 
Management 273 (2009). 
 135. Id. at 49. 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1996); see Ireland et al.; supra note 134, at 273. 
 137. Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14072–14073. 
 138. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 
1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 27, & 42 U.S.C.). 
 139. The first community notification provision was in Washington State as a provision of the state’s 
Community Protection Act of 1990. Scott Matson, Washington State Inst. for Pub. Policy, Sex 
Offender Community Notification Update 1 (1996); see, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 71A 09 (1993). 
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registration requirements should be applied to juveniles; each jurisdiction 
decided individually whether and how to register juveniles that were 
adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses.140 Before 2006, approximately 
thirty states required juveniles to register in some way.141 The schemes 
that the states adopted varied widely in terms of judicial discretion, 
registration terms, community notification, and residency, work, and 
housing restrictions.142 Some states went further and applied additional 
restrictions,143 like school and foster care restrictions,144 and other states 
attempted to apply such controls.145 
 
 140. Juveniles convicted as adults were required to register under the Jacob Wetterling Act. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–14073 (repealed 2006). 
 141. Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 14. 
 142. Some states did not require juveniles to register. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 846E–2 (2013). 
Other states gave judges the discretion to determine whether or not to order juveniles to register. See, 
e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.83(D) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (listing factors Ohio judges consider 
when determining whether to assign registration for offenses that do not mandate registration). Some 
states gave judges discretion to determine registration terms, while others removed judicial discretion 
and required mandatory lifetime registration terms. See Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 32. Some 
states required community notification for juveniles, but the majority of states did not. Id. Some states 
imposed residency, work and other restrictions on juvenile registrants, while other states explicitly 
refused to do so. Id. at 66, 69 (comparing Georgia and Illinois). 
 143. Georgia applies the same restrictions on adults and juveniles. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42-1-12 
to 42-1-19 (2013) (listing the registration requirements and subsequent restrictions for sex offenders in 
Georgia); see also Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 66. Michigan has explicitly refused to apply 
residency restrictions to juveniles. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.735 (2013) (outlining residency 
requirements for registered sex offenders; Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.736 (exempting juveniles from the 
residency requirements); see also Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 78. Illinois does not impose 
residency restrictions on juveniles. See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/8(a) (2013) (implementing residency 
requirements for certain sex offenders); see also Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 69. 
 144. For example, Illinois recently passed a law requiring juvenile sex offenders to stay off and 
away from school property. Patrick Yeagle, Opponents: New Sex Offender Laws Won’t Help, Ill. 
Times (May 13, 2010), http://www.illinoistimes.com/Springfield/article-7293-opponents-new-sex-
offender-laws-wont-help.html. 
 145. See State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 421 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding Alabama’s registration 
and community notification scheme unconstitutional as applied to juveniles because the Act goes 
beyond what is necessary to protect public safety). 
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B. New Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, Notification, and 
Restrictions in 2006 and Beyond: Responses to the Adam Walsh 
Act (SORNA)146 
On July 20, 2006, Congress repealed the Jacob Wetterling Act and 
replaced it with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (the 
“Adam Walsh Act”).147 Title I of the Adam Walsh Act, the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), attempts to set a national 
baseline for sex offender registration.148 SORNA requires that states 
receiving federal crime prevention funds (“Byrne Funds”) substantially 
comply with the registration guidelines that it outlines.149 
In states that comply with SORNA, judges do not have discretion to 
excuse a juvenile who has committed certain registerable offenses from 
registration requirements based on risk assessment or other factors.150 
SORNA requires a three-tier registration system.151 Tier I is a catch-all 
for all lesser offenses that do not qualify for higher-level tier status;152 
 
 146. In 2006, the Adam Walsh Act was passed. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 21, 28, 
& 42 U.S.C.). Ohio was the first state to come into substantial compliance. S. 10, 127th Gen. Assemb. 
(Ohio 2003) (enacted). Few other jurisdictions complied. See SMART, supra note 18 (listing states in 
compliance). On January 11, 2011, the U.S. Attorney General issued Supplemental Guidelines for Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification. 76 Fed. Reg. 1630 (Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Supplemental 
Guidelines]. They changed the original guidelines significantly. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, 
at 38030. The Attorney General noted that one of the largest barriers to implementation was that 
SORNA required registration for juveniles at least fourteen years old who were “adjudicated delinquent 
for particularly serious sex offenses.” Supplemental Guidelines, supra, at 1636. Because of resistance from 
states, the Attorney General removed the public notification requirement and allowed that jurisdictions 
that did not put juveniles on the website also did not have to provide registry information to school, public 
housing, social service, and volunteer entities, and other organizations, companies, or individuals who 
request information: “There is no remaining requirement under SORNA that jurisdictions engage in any 
form of public disclosure or notification regarding juvenile delinquent sex offenders. Jurisdictions are free 
to do so, but need not do so to any greater extent than they may wish.” Id. 
 147. See generally SORNA § 101 (2006). 
 148. President George W. Bush stated that the Adam Walsh Act would help law enforcement 
protect children by “expand[ing] the National Sex Offender Registry by integrating the information in 
State sex offender registry systems and ensuring that law enforcement has access to the same 
information across the United States.” Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006, 42 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1395, 1396 (July 27, 2006). 
 149.  States lose ten percent of federal Byrne funds for non-compliance. See Office of Sex 
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, & Tracking, Dep’t of Justice, 
Requests for Reallocation of Byrne JAG Funding Penalty 2 (2012). 
 150. For example, in 2013, legislators proposed House Bill 182, which provides the Delaware 
Family Court discretion to designate—or not designate—juveniles under fourteen as sex offenders, 
thus subjecting them to registration and reporting requirements. The bill also provides for judicial 
review of registration requirements for juveniles over fourteen who committed certain offenses. H.R. 
182, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013) (codified as amended at Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1009(c) 
(2013)). 
 151. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38041–42. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2) (2006). 
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these offenses require fifteen years of registration.153 Tier II offenses are 
punishable by more than one year in prison but are not classified as the 
most severe sex offenses.154 They require twenty-five years of 
registration.155 Tier III sex offenses are considered the most serious 
offenses punishable by more than one year in prison.156 Tier III offenders 
must register for life,157 but they are eligible to petition a court for 
registry termination after twenty-five years of good behavior.158 
The United States Attorney General issued guidelines and 
regulations that inform jurisdictions how to implement SORNA.159 State 
compliance is overseen by the federal Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, 
Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART”).160 
Before 2006, whether and how to register juveniles had been 
determined by each state. However, states seeking to become 
substantially compliant with SORNA were required to implement 
standard registration161 and community notification162 requirements for 
both juveniles and adults. Under SORNA and the proposed 
implementation guidelines published in 2006, all of the same registration 
and notification standards would apply to juveniles and adults.163 
SORNA also required mandatory sentences for certain offenses, 
whether committed by juveniles or adults.164 In order to be substantially 
compliant with SORNA, states were required to impose mandatory 
registration upon any juvenile convicted as an adult and any juvenile 
over fourteen adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense equivalent to 
aggravated sexual abuse.165 These crimes were automatically classified as 
 
 153. SORNA §§ 115–16 (2006). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(3). 
 155. SORNA § 115. 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A). 
 157. SORNA § 115. 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 16915(b)(3)(B). 
 159. Office of Sex Offender Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, & Tracking, Office of 
Justice Programs, SORNA, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/sorna.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) 
[hereinafter SMART Website]. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Under SORNA, juveniles tried as adults and juveniles over fourteen adjudicated for an 
offense “comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse” are required to register for 
twenty-five years or life. SORNA § 111. Aggravated sexual abuse includes, among other things, 
engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of twelve. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2007). 
 162. Initially, SORNA required internet notification. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38030. 
 163. SORNA § 202. 
 164. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38030. 
 165. Under federal law, aggravated sexual abuse includes: (1) sexual abuse by force or threat; 
(2) sexual abuse by rendering another person unconscious and engaging in a sexual act with that person; 
or (3) knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor under the age of twelve. 18 U.S.C. § 2241. 
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Tier III, the most severe offenses.166 SORNA and the 2006 guidelines did 
not allow judicial discretion to decide whether registration was 
appropriate for juveniles convicted as adults—or who committed Tier III 
offenses—and required juvenile registrants to wait twenty-five years 
before petitioning the court for registry termination.167 These offenses 
also required community notification of sex offender status, placing 
juveniles on internet-searchable public databases.168 
The Attorney General issued interim guidelines in March 2007.169 
There was significant debate at that time about whether SORNA’s 
requirements should apply to juveniles.170 Many jurisdictions had resisted 
the provisions of SORNA as applied to juveniles, finding them extreme, 
overbroad, and in conflict with the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile 
court.171 One main concern was the lifetime registration requirement for a 
youth who knowingly engaged in a sex act with a minor under twelve; this 
requirement was removed from the SORNA Guidelines in 2008 in 
response to juvenile advocates’ arguments that the provision was 
developmentally inappropriate.172 In 2010, the mandatory community 
notification requirements were also removed from the SORNA 
Guidelines in response to juvenile advocates’ arguments that community 
notification violates the confidentiality provisions and protections of the 
juvenile court.173 The final guidelines, published in 2011, allow states to 
withhold information about juveniles from the public registry and still be 
considered to be in substantial compliance.174 States now have the 
 
 166. A Tier III sex offender under SORNA is a sex offender whose offense is punishable by more 
than a year, and the offense “(1) is comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse; (2) is 
abusive sexual contact against a minor twelve years or younger; or (3) involves kidnapping of a 
minor.” See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 167. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38068. 
 168. Id. at 38060. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S8012, S8027 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 171. The Council of State Governments surveyed states on which factors were impeding SORNA 
implementation and noted that the most common cited barrier were the juvenile registration and 
reporting requirements. Council of State Gov’ts, SORNA and Sex Offender Policy in the States 
5 (2010). Twenty-three of forty-seven states responding reported that they found the juvenile 
provisions problematic. Id. at 4. Of the states reporting, forty-two indicated that implementation 
would require new or additional legislation to achieve compliance. Id. Of states responding, seventy-
three percent reported that the SORNA requirements were somewhat inconsistent or highly 
inconsistent with state systems; the areas of inconsistency included excluding juveniles from the 
registry, purging juvenile records at twenty-one, and community notification. Id. Some states resisted 
adopting an offense-based system when most had already adopted a risk-based system that accounted 
for individual assessment. Id. 
 172. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38041. 
 173. Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 75 Fed. Reg. 27362, 
27363 (May 14, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 174. Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1630 (permitting states to withhold information 
including email addresses and other Internet identifiers); see 42 U.S.C. § 16915a (2008). 
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discretion to disseminate juveniles’ information publicly, but are not 
required to do so.175 
C. State Action Since SORNA 
The original deadline for jurisdictions to substantially comply with 
SORNA was July 27, 2009.176 As that date approached, at most one state 
was in substantial compliance.177 The U.S. Attorney General granted a 
one-year extension.178 As of July 2012, only fifteen states substantially 
complied with SORNA.179 Some states rejected the SORNA 
requirements outright because they were inconsistent with current state 
sex offender policies.180 Other states decided not to come into compliance 
because the expense of implementation would exceed the amount of 
money equal to ten percent of their Byrne funds.181 Still other states have 
attempted to come into compliance but have not been able to pass 
legislation to do so.182 SORNA challenges have ensued on various bases, 
some successful, some not.183 
 
 175. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 7, at 38032. SORNA standards “set a floor, not a ceiling” for 
sex offender registration programs. Id. SORNA places almost no limits on states’ discretion to adopt 
broader registration and notification provisions. Id. at 38032–35. A 2007 study indicated that at least 
twenty-five states disseminated juvenile registrants’ information via the Internet. See Brenda V. Smith 
& Jaime M. Yarussi, Nat’l Inst. of Corrs., Breaking the Code of Silence (2007), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/BreakingtheCodeofSilence_CorrectionalOfficers
Handbook.pdf. 
 176. See Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, & 
Tracking, SORNA Implementation Guidance, Smart Watch Newsl. (Winter 2010), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/smartwatch/10_winter/pfv.html. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. As of spring 2012, the states in compliance were Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming. See Pittman Presentation, supra note 18. Pennsylvania is now also in 
compliance with SORNA. See SMART, supra note 18. 
 180. See, e.g., Texas Latest State Refusing to Join Sex-Offender Registry, FOXNews.com, Oct. 7, 
2012, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/07/texas-latest-state-refusing-to-join-sex-offender-registry/ 
(citing one reason for resistance as losing the individualized risk assessment process), see also 
Levenson & Cotter, supra note 123. 
 181. See, e.g., Senate Criminal Justice Comm., Interim Report, 81st Sess. Interim, at 14 (Tex. 
2010), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c590/c590.InterimReport81.pdf; 
Justice Policy Inst., What Will it Cost States to Come into Compliance with the Sex Offender 
Notification and Registration Act? (2008). For an overview of state compliance, see Nat’l 
Consortium for Justice Info. & Statistics, Survey on State Compliance With the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) (2009). 
 182. See, e.g., S.B. 1040, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011); H.B. 893, 195th Gen. 
Assemb. (Pa. 2011). 
 183. See, e.g., Abigail Goldman, Juvenile Sex Offender Laws Struck Down—For Now, Las Vegas 
Sun, Apr. 6, 2008, at 8; cf. ACLU of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1056–58 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that a Nevada law that expanded the definition of a sex offender was not punitive and respects due 
process rights). 
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IV.  What the Courts Say 
When looking at the constitutionality of sex offender registration, 
community notification, and other restrictions imposed on sex offenders, 
courts examine the nature and extent of the burden imposed on the 
registrant, and whether it is excessive in relation to its purpose.184 
In recent years, courts have acknowledged that registration imposes 
intrusive burdens on the registrant, including lengthy registration terms, 
GPS monitoring, frequent in-person reporting, and increased 
dissemination of previously private information.185 
Community notification schemes have evolved as technology and 
laws have changed. When first introduced, community notification 
schemes were used by law enforcement to disseminate information to 
people who might be in immediate risk of harm,186 but as sex offender 
registration and community notification schemes have evolved, the 
general public can access a wealth of identifying information about sex 
offender registrants via the internet.187 Making this information public is 
more problematic for juveniles than the public becoming aware of a 
conviction or adjudication because Internet-accessible registry 
information is easily accessible in a way that juvenile court files are not. 
The exposure, and the risks associated with it, imposes a heavy burden 
on registrants that some courts have recognized as punishment—cruel 
and unusual or otherwise. 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
1. Sex Offender Registration and the Issue of Punishment 
Before grappling with the issue of whether lifetime mandatory sex 
offender registration for juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual 
 
 184. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003). 
 185. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2006) (authorizing the U.S. 
Attorney General to award grants to states and governments to develop programs that fit sex 
offenders with electronic monitoring); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:542 (2012) (requiring registrants to 
provide lengthy information including: palm prints, a DNA sample, all landline and telephone 
numbers, and requiring that “Sex Offender” be printed on the registrant’s driver’s license); State v. 
Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 2004) (imposing lifelong registration requirements on sexual 
predators “imposes more than a stigma”). 
 186. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 63 Hastings L.J. 1071, 1088–89 (2012) (noting that in 2001, Louisiana’s 
registration statute required that registrants provide name, address, place of employment, crime of 
conviction, place and date of conviction, aliases, and social security number; in 2012, Louisiana’s 
registration statute required name, aliases, physical description, addresses of housing and school, 
current photograph, fingerprints, palm prints, DNA sample, description of every vehicle driven, copy 
of driver’s license, and every email address, online screen name, and other online identifiers). 
 187. Id. 
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punishment, courts must establish that such a requirement is punitive—in 
intent or effect—and not simply regulatory. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Smith v. Doe.188 Justice 
Souter recognized that sex offender registration schemes share 
characteristics that are both regulatory and punitive.189 Courts must 
determine whether there are factors that “tip[] the scale,” thereby 
making a scheme punitive.190 
When determining whether a scheme is regulatory or punitive, 
courts first look to whether the legislature intended for the scheme to be 
civil or criminal.191 Even if the legislature intends for the scheme to serve 
a civil purpose, it may still impose a criminal penalty if the scheme is “so 
punitive in either purpose or effect as to . . . . transform . . . a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.”192 Courts must determine whether legislation 
that was intended to regulate is excessive in relation to its non-punitive 
purpose.193 
When determining whether a piece of legislation is excessive, courts 
apply the seven-factor test articulated in Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment[,] whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will 
promote traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, 
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.194 
The Court applied this analysis in Smith, which concerned an adult 
registration scheme, and found that it was not punitive.195  
 The Court had the opportunity to review a juvenile scheme in 
United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male II”) but did not reach the 
merits.196 The strong differences between the majority and the dissents in 
Smith suggest that the Court might find the restrictions punitive as 
 
 188. Smith, 538 U.S. at 84. 
 189. Id. at 110 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 190. Id. at 92. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (citations omitted). 
 193. Id. 
 194. 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (emphasis in original). 
 195. 538 U.S. at 97–99. In 2005, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Smith but held that 
Ohio’s juvenile registration statute did not constitute “retroactive criminal punishment.” Doe v. 
Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005). In 2013, the Fourth Circuit held that SORNA’s registration 
requirement did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 
257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013).   
 196. 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2862 (2011). 
1. Halbrook_30 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:17 PM 
28 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1 
 
applied to juveniles, especially if the Court were to take into account 
what it has recently acknowledged about adolescent development. 
a. Smith v. Doe 
In Smith, the Supreme Court addressed whether a sex offender 
registration scheme violated the Ex Post Facto Clause197 of the 
Constitution by requiring retroactive application to adult sex offenders 
who were convicted prior to the enactment of the scheme; the Court 
found that it did not because the registration scheme was civil in 
nature.198 
 
 197. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. 
 198. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96. It should be noted that, while the majority of cases that address 
registration schemes as applied to adults and found them regulatory in nature, courts have found sex 
offender registration and community notification schemes punitive where they exceeded non-punitive 
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. George, 
625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 672 F.3d 1126 (2012); United States v. DiTomasso, 621 
F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 
158–59 (3d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012); United States v. 
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 203–06 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1207 
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Reynolds 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2008), 
abrogated by Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012); cf. ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 719 F. 
Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (D. Nev. 2008), rev’d, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding retroactive 
application of revised statutes governing classification, monitoring, and residency violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because the statutes automatically classified based on crime committed, and numerous 
people whose crimes had been committed in the distant past and who were unlikely to reoffend were 
subjected to the state’s requirements); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (reasoning 
that after statutory scheme was “changed dramatically” when Ohio came into substantial compliance 
with the Adam Walsh Act, the new burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities imposed were punitive in 
nature); Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 112–13 (Ind. 2010) (regulatory scheme was punitive where 
most factors of intent-effect test advanced a punitive interest); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 
(Ind. 2009) (“ [By r]estricting the residence of offenders . . . without considering whether a particular 
offender is a danger to the general public, the statute exceeds its non-punitive purposes.”); Wallace v. 
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (“[T]he non-punitive purpose of the Act . . . does not serve to 
render as non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping.”); Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 932 A.2d 552, 
563 (Me. 2007) (“The fact that a sex offender never has the ability to escape the registration 
requirements . . . regardless of behavior, consequences, or contributions following the conviction, 
strikes us as having the capability to be excessive and as diverging from the purpose of protecting the 
public.”); State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 419–20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (finding amendments to 
Alabama’s registration and community notification scheme which prohibited a juvenile sex offender 
from returning to the family home violated Ex Post Facto clause where the provision applied the 
broadest application of registration and community notification regardless of whether they were 
applied to juveniles or adults). But cf. United States v. Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 490–92 (6th Cir. 
2013) (finding no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause when juvenile did not provide the “clearest 
proof” that SORNA was so punitive in effect as applied to juveniles); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 
1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying SORNA based on a state conviction as a juvenile sex offender not 
punitive). 
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In Smith, respondents Doe I and Doe II had been convicted of 
aggravated sex offenses in Alaska.199 Both had served prison time and 
had completed sex offender treatment.200 Doe I pled guilty nine years 
before the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act was enacted.201 He 
obtained early supervised release as a result of treatment compliance and 
because he posed a low risk of sexually reoffending.202 He married, 
started a business, reunited with his family, and was granted custody of 
his minor daughter after the court determined that he had been 
rehabilitated.203 
After the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act was enacted, 
however, Doe I was required to register four times a year and was subject 
to community notification because Alaska’s Act was applied 
retroactively.204 Doe I appealed, and the case went to the Supreme Court 
based on Doe’s argument that retroactive application of the Act violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.205 
The Court’s majority opinion described the process for determining 
whether a piece of legislation that was intended to regulate is excessive in 
relation to its non-punitive purpose.206 The Court noted that the first 
factor is whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint.207 When determining whether registrants suffer from an 
affirmative disability or restraint, the Court considers: (1) whether the 
law imposes physical restraint; if no physical restraint, (2) whether the 
law involves a restriction on activities that could otherwise be considered 
restraint; and (3) if no restraint, either physically or effectively, whether 
the sanctions imposed involve the type of shame and humiliation 
traditionally associated with shaming punishments.208 The Court 
identified historical shaming punishments to include banishment, loss of 
freedom of movement, public shame and humiliation, occupational or 
residency challenges, and conditions analogous to probation or 
supervised release.209 
Despite the fact that many courts had previously held that sex 
offender registration schemes are non-punitive, the Court recognized 
 
 199. Smith, 538 U.S. at 84. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 91, 117. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 90–91. 
 205. Id. at 84. 
 206. Id. at 97. 
 207. Id. at 99–100. 
 208. Id. at 98–101. 
 209. Id. See id. at 109 n.* (Souter, J., concurring) (“There is significant evidence of onerous 
practical effects of being listed on a sex offender registry.”). 
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that sex offender registration and community notification laws serve to 
shame and isolate the registrant.210 However, the majority noted that, 
under the Alaska scheme, sex offender registrants were not banished 
from their communities because they were able to move around and 
work as other citizens.211 The majority further stated that “[o]ur system 
does not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a 
legitimate governmental objective as punishment,” and ultimately held 
the Alaska scheme to be non-punitive.212 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority failed to 
decide whether the Act deprived registrants of liberty.213 He argued that 
sex offender registration statutes “impose significant affirmative 
obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply.”214 
Finally, he argued that the Act was punitive because it severely deprived 
registrants of their liberty, imposed restraints on everyone in the class of 
registrants, and did not restrain anyone else.215 
Justice Ginsberg argued in her dissent that the registration scheme 
constituted punishment because: (1) registration and notification were 
comparable to parole; (2) the Act’s requirements were reminiscent of 
public shaming; (3) the registration requirements were based on past 
crimes, not present risk; (4) registration did not prevent future crimes; 
(5) the registration term was not based on the risk of re-offense; 
(6) notification was required four times a year even if the information 
had not changed; and (7) the Act provided no possible way to shorten 
the term, through rehabilitation or proof of incapacitation.216 Therefore, 
she argued that the Act was punitive in both its intent and result.217 
These dissents could be important predictors of how the Court 
might rule on whether sex offender registration laws are punitive post-
SORNA. It should be noted that when the Smith decision was entered in 
2003, sex offender laws were less restrictive than they are post-SORNA, 
giving rise to the possibility that the Court would now consider current 
sex offender registration requirements unconstitutional even as applied to 
adults.218 In addition to a larger number of registerable offenses,219 
 
 210. Id. at 99 (“It must be acknowledged that notice of criminal conviction subjects the offender to 
public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the extent of the publicity. And the geographic 
reach of the Internet is greater than anything that could have been designed in colonial times.”). 
 211. Id. at 101. 
 212. Id. at 98, 105–06. 
 213. Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 111–12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. at 115–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 218. Although the Court split 6-3 in Smith, three members of the majority—and one in the 
dissent—have since retired. As a result, the addition of Justices Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagen 
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increased penalties now include extended registration terms,220 
dissemination of additional personal information,221 expanded community 
notification requirements,222 oppressive residency restrictions,223 and GPS 
monitoring.224 
Even if sex offender registration were deemed regulatory as applied 
to adults, the issue before us is whether, as applied to juveniles, 
registrants face public shame and humiliation that reaches the level of 
historic notions of punishment. Being placed on a public registry is not 
the same for juveniles as it would be for adults, because juvenile cases 
are traditionally kept confidential.225 Once their names and identifying 
information is disseminated on the Internet, juvenile sex offender 
registrants face permanent stigma226 that remains even after the 
 
to the Court could change the balance for sex offender registration requirements. For a discussion of 
the evolution of adult sex offender registration schemes, see Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 186. 
 219. Id. at 1082 (noting that Utah’s registration scheme contained nineteen triggering offenses in 
2000 and twenty-nine triggering offenses in 2011). 
 220. Id. at 1083 (noting that reclassification of crimes post-SORNA have increased penalties and 
registration/notification requirements). See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031(A)(1)–(2) (West 
2007) (specifying new classifications post-SORNA and their retroactivity), held unconstitutional by 
State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 2010). 
 221. Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 186, at 1088–89 (noting that, for example, in 2001, 
Louisiana’s registration statute required that registrants provide name, address, place of employment, 
crime for which he was convicted, place and date of conviction, aliases and social security number; in 
2012, Louisiana’s registration statute required name, aliases, physical description, addresses of housing 
and school, current photograph, fingerprints, palm prints, DNA sample, description of every vehicle 
driven, copy of driver’s license, every email address, online screen name, and other online identifiers). 
 222. Id. at 1090–93 (noting that, when community notification was first introduced, information 
was narrowly disseminated; current online registry information contains extensive information about 
registrants, including detailed physical descriptions, home and work addresses, and maps to their 
locations). 
 223. Id. at 1096–98 (noting that, when first introduced, restrictions prohibited sex offenders from 
living within 1,000 feet of places where minors congregate—including schools, daycare centers, and 
parks; current legislation often require the buffer zone to be 2,500 feet and places where minors 
congregate have been expanded to include bus stops, arcades, and libraries); see Formaro v. Polk 
Cnty., 773 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 2009) (holding the 2000-foot restriction constitutional). 
 224. Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 186, at 1098 (noting that as many as thirty-nine states 
permit some form of electronic monitoring of sex offenders). 
 225. While federal SORNA guidelines no longer require public disclosure of registrants who were 
adjudicated delinquent, see Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1632, it leaves states and 
Indian Tribes the authority to do so. United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male I”), 590 F.3d 924, 
937 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) (“Historically, information from juvenile 
adjudications has been made public only when a juvenile’s case is transferred to adult criminal court 
for punitive purposes.”). 
 226. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Smith v. Doe focused on the severe stigmatizing effect of 
registration on the registrant and stated that “these statutes unquestionable affect a constitutionally 
protected interest in liberty.” 538 U.S. 84, 112 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent, in which Justice Breyer joined, focused on “profound humiliation and community-wide 
ostracism,” “onerous and intrusive obligations on convicted sex offenders,” and concerns about 
lifetime labeling of an individual who showed strong evidence of rehabilitation. Id. at 115–17 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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information is removed from the registry.227 By subjecting juvenile sex 
offenders to community notification while keeping other juvenile 
offenses confidential, community notification implies that juvenile sex 
offenders are more dangerous than other young people in the juvenile 
justice system. This may exacerbate existing problems with housing and 
employment because young registrants are not able to easily change 
residences228 and employment options are already scarce.229 
The critical factor to consider in this discussion is whether current 
registration schemes applied to juveniles are excessive in relation to their 
regulatory purpose. Although courts have consistently found that 
registration and community notification schemes are reasonably related 
to a non-punitive goal—promoting public safety—laws that require 
lifetime registration based on offense rather than risk, without the 
possibility of review, do not allow for the individualized assessment to 
which juveniles are entitled.230 This is of special concern because “[t]here 
is no evidence . . . that the ‘high rate of recidivism’ at issue in Doe is 
shared by juvenile offenders.”231 In her Smith dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
expressed specific concern about the constitutionality of sex offender 
registration schemes that do not allow for individualized risk assessment 
or the opportunity to prove rehabilitation.232 It is possible that, as applied 
to juveniles post-SORNA, additional Justices would take the same 
position. 
Although the Court in Smith asserted that the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act was not punitive because it was not excessive in relation 
to its non-punitive purpose, this reasoning should not be applied to 
juveniles. By failing to recognize juvenile status and provide the 
traditional confidentiality protections afforded to juveniles,233 mandatory 
lifetime juvenile sex offender registration tips the scale from regulatory 
 
 227. See Pittman & Parker, supra note 125, at 50–75. 
 228. Juvenile Male I, 590 F.3d at 935 (Registration and community notification “seriously 
jeopardizes the ability of such individuals to obtain employment, housing, and education.”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Juveniles are entitled to individualized sentencing. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2468 (2012). 
 231. Juvenile Male I, 590 F.3d at 940. 
 232. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 117 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (taking the position that the 
Alaska sex offender registration scheme was punitive, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “the Act makes no 
provision whatever for the possibility of rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their registration or 
notification period, even on the clearest demonstration of rehabilitation.”). It should be noted that 
Justice Ginsburg joined the majority in Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, decided the same year 
as Smith, which determined that procedural due process did not require individualized risk assessment 
for community notification. 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). 
 233. See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 87–88 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding 
confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act include, among other things, the 
requirement that “neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection 
with a juvenile delinquency proceeding.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1996))). 
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to punitive.234 Doing so fails to take into account juvenile status, the fact 
that community notification violates the traditional confidentiality 
protections afforded to juveniles, and that registry and community 
notification risks are often greater for juveniles than they are for adults. 
Moreover, Smith did not discuss whether imposing lifetime registration 
on a juvenile would conflict with the Court’s jurisprudence on juvenile 
offenders and culpability, that juveniles should not be subject to the most 
serious punishments, or with the idea that juveniles are typically not 
treated the same as adult offenders even when they have committed the 
same crimes. If the Court had considered the registration scheme as 
applied to juveniles, and taken into consideration each of these things, it 
might have come to a different opinion.235 
b. United States v. Juvenile Male 
United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male I”) involved a 
juvenile offender convicted of a sex offense. Subsequent to his 
conviction, Congress enacted SORNA, which required juveniles to 
register in any jurisdiction where they resided, were employed, or 
attended school.236 The juvenile was required to register.237 The Ninth 
Circuit vacated the district court’s registration requirement, holding that 
retroactive application of the federal statute was punitive and violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.238 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Juvenile 
Male I from Smith, focusing on the fact that SORNA’s registration 
requirements would impose conditions that would not typically follow a 
juvenile adjudication, which is normally confidential.239 Applying 
SORNA would expose information previously held to be confidential, 
impose more in-person reporting requirements, and increase the 
minimum registration term to twenty-five years.240 
 
 234. See id. at 90. 
 235. To do so, the Court would have to take into account the cases discussed in Part IV, infra. 
 236. Juvenile Male I, 590 F.3d at 928. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 941–42. 
 239. Id. at 926 (“As a society, we generally refuse to punish our nation’s youth as harshly as we do 
our fellow adults, or hold them to the same level of culpability as people who are older, wiser, and 
more mature. The avowed priority of our juvenile justice system (in theory if not always in practice) 
has, historically, been rehabilitation rather than retribution. Juvenile proceedings by and large take 
place away from the public eye, and do not become part of a young person’s permanent criminal 
record. . . . [h]istorically, an essential aspect of the juvenile justice system has been to maintain the 
privacy of the young offender and, contrary to our criminal law system, to shield him from the 
‘dissemination of truthful information’ and ‘transparency’ that characterizes the punitive system in 
which we try adults.”). 
 240. Id. at 927. 
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The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.241 The 
Court recognized that the juvenile’s court supervision had ended when 
he turned twenty-one—prior to the Ninth Circuit decision.242 When a 
juvenile challenges an expired sentence, he must show that there is an 
ongoing collateral consequence that is traceable to the underlying 
sentence in order to proceed.243 Although the juvenile had an ongoing 
duty to register based on state law, the requirement was not due to the 
special condition of supervision.244 As a result, the Court vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s Ex Post Facto holding as moot, finding a lack of 
Article III jurisdiction.245 
Due to the jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court never reached the 
merits in United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male II”), so we do not 
know how the Court might rule on a case involving juvenile registration. 
The fact that the Court was not unanimous in Smith, and that there were 
strong dissents related specifically to confidentiality issues, indicate the 
possibility that the Court would come out differently on the issue of 
registration as applied to juveniles, particularly if the Court took into 
account its positions on adolescent development emphasized in Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama.246 The 
developmental and neurological factors present in those cases, and the 
Court’s acknowledgement of their importance when determining the 
appropriateness of a punishment, should be relevant to a determination 
of whether lifetime mandatory sex offender registration is an appropriate 
punishment. 
After the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the 
case returned to the Ninth Circuit for review in United States v. Juvenile 
Male (“Juvenile Male III”).247 The court addressed whether the SORNA 
registration requirement, as applied to certain juvenile delinquents in 
cases of aggravated sexual assault, superseded confidentiality provisions 
of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and whether SORNA 
registration violated juveniles’ constitutional rights.248 The Ninth Circuit 
looked at the conflict between the confidentiality provisions of the 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and the disclosure requirements of 
SORNA.249 Based on that review, the court held that “both the statutory 
text and legislative history of SORNA suggest its reporting and 
 
 241. United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male II”), 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011). 
 242. Id. at 2865. 
 243. Id. at 2864. 
 244. Id. at 2865. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See infra Part IV. 
 247. United States v. Juvenile Male (“Juvenile Male III”), 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 248. Id. at 1014. 
 249. Id. at 1008. 
1. Halbrook_30 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:17 PM 
December 2013]         JUVENILE PARIAHS 35 
 
registration requirements were intended to reach a limited class of 
juveniles adjudicated delinquent in cases of aggravated sexual abuse, 
including appellants.”250 
The court then went on to address certain constitutional claims 
brought by appellants, including allegations that SORNA’s juvenile 
registration requirements are unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, 
the right against self-incrimination, substantive due process, procedural 
due process, and the right to effective assistance of counsel.251 Speaking 
to the issue of cruel and unusual punishment, the court held that 
“[a]lthough defendants understandably note that SORNA may have the 
effect of exposing juvenile defendants and their families to potential 
shame and humiliation for acts committed while still an adolescent, the 
statute does not meet the high standard of cruel and unusual 
punishment.”252 
While Juvenile Male III held that sex offender registration did not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment as applied to juveniles, it did 
not address the fact that federal and state SORNA laws create a federal 
crime for failure to register—with punishments including incarceration—
and impose increased registration and notification requirements for 
offenders based on offense rather than risk.253 More recently, other 
jurisdictions have held the same or similar restrictions to constitute 
punishment, particularly when juvenile status is considered.254 
2. Juvenile Sentencing Cases 
Assuming that mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and 
community notification constitutes punishment when applied to 
juveniles, the next step in the analysis is whether that punishment is cruel 
and unusual. 
Over the last seven years, the Supreme Court has incrementally 
addressed appropriate punishment for juvenile offenders.255 From Roper 
and Graham to Miller, the Court relied on the Eighth Amendment’s 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 1008–09. 
 252. Id. at 1010 (“The requirement that juveniles register in a sex offender database for at least 25 
years because they committed the equivalent of aggravated sexual abuse is not a disproportionate 
punishment. These juveniles do not face any risk of incarceration or threat of physical harm.”). 
 253. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 753–54 (Ohio 2011). 
 254. Id. 
 255. The Supreme Court has addressed the fundamental differences between youth and adults 
many times. See generally J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815 (1988); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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requirement of proportionality to determine that death and mandatory 
lifetime sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional.256 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted.”257 The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that 
juveniles are a distinct group of offenders due to developmental 
immaturity, and that consideration of age is important to an assessment 
of whether a punishment is just. The Court held, for example, that youth 
is “more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when 
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage. . . . [p]articularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment’ expected of adults.”258 
The Court has also noted that throughout its history, it has 
“observed that children generally are less mature and responsible than 
adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, that they 
are more vulnerable or susceptible to outside pressures than adults.”259 
Further, the Court has found that “none of what is said about children—
about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities—is crime specific.”260 
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to preserve the “dignity 
of man,” and to ensure that the state’s power to enforce the amendment 
is “exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”261 Aside from 
“[f]ines, imprisonment and even execution,” other forms of punishment 
are “constitutionally suspect.”262 Further, the Eighth Amendment is not 
static, but is defined by the “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”263 
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires 
“that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
[the] offense.”264 A proportionality review can involve “cases in which the 
 
 256. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (tracing the history of the Eighth 
Amendment’s requirement of proportionality).  
 257. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The provision is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curium). 
 258. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (quoting Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 
(1979)). 
 259. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 260. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 261. Id. at 100. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 101. 
 264. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 367 (1910)). 
1. Halbrook_30 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:17 PM 
December 2013]         JUVENILE PARIAHS 37 
 
Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical 
restrictions.”265 When that happens, a court may consider “the nature of 
the offense” or “the characteristics of the offender.”266 Some offenders, 
including juveniles, are categorically different; proportionate penalties 
must recognize and account for juveniles as a special class of offenders 
with a reduced level of culpability.267 
a. Roper v. Simmons 
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper looked at the issue of whether 
it was permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
impose the death penalty on a youth aged seventeen or under.268 When 
he was seventeen, Christopher Simmons committed capital murder.269 He 
was sentenced to death after he turned eighteen.270 He filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief, arguing that the Constitution prohibited the 
execution of juveniles based on the reasoning articulated in Atkins v. 
Virginia.271 The Court considered “evolving standards of decency” as part 
of its proportionality analysis.272 It determined that there was a national 
consensus against the death penalty for juveniles273 because (1) the death 
penalty had been rejected in a majority of states,274 (2) it was infrequently 
used even when allowed,275 and (3) there was scientific evidence that our 
society now considers juveniles “categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal.”276 The Court highlighted three differences that show 
that juveniles should not be classified among the “worst offenders”: 
juveniles are less morally reprehensible than adults due to their 
immaturity; juveniles are vulnerable and lack control over their own 
environment; and juveniles’ struggle with identity development indicates 
that it is not correct to conclude that a crime committed by a juvenile is 
evidence of depraved character.277 Finally, the Court noted that the 
United States is the only country in the world that gives the “official 
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”278 After balancing the relevant 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 2022. 
 267. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 268. Roper, 543 U.S. at 555–56. 
 269. Id. at 556. 
 270. Id. at 558. 
 271. Id. at 559. 
 272. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)). 
 273. Id. at 567. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)). 
 277. Id. at 569–70. 
 278. Id. at 575. 
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factors, the Court held that the death penalty constituted a 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under eighteen.279 
b. Graham v. Florida 
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Graham looked at the issue of 
whether a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a non-
homicide crime is categorically cruel and unusual in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.280 Terrance Graham was charged with armed 
burglary and attempted robbery for offenses that occurred when he was 
seventeen.281 At the time of his offense, he was on probation for a 
different burglary committed when he was sixteen.282 He was convicted 
and sentenced to life in prison on the armed burglary charge and fifteen 
years on the attempted robbery.283 Because Florida had abolished its 
parole system, the only way that he could obtain release would be to 
obtain executive clemency.284 
Relying on Roper, the Court found that the Eighth Amendment did 
not permit the state to deny a juvenile’s right to “demonstrate that he is 
fit to rejoin society” after committing a non-homicide crime as a child.285 
The Court then applied a proportionality analysis to determine whether 
a punishment is cruel and unusual.286 The Court considered (1) whether 
there is a balance between the culpability of the offender and the severity 
of the punishment; and (2) whether the sentence serves legitimate 
penological goals.287 The Court noted that the culpability of offenders 
should be assessed “in light of their crimes and characteristics.”288 Thus, 
in evaluating the punishment, the Court evaluates whether the 
punishment serves “legitimate penological goals.”289 
Addressing the issue of culpability, the Court reiterated that 
juveniles are less culpable than adult offenders and are, therefore, less 
deserving of the “most severe punishments.”290 In evaluating the severity 
of a punishment, the Court noted that it considers the severity of the 
punishment generally, and again as applied to a juvenile.291 Even when 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2010). 
 281. Id. at 2018. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 2020. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 2033. 
 286. Id. at 2021. 
 287. Id. at 2026. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. (citations omitted). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
1. Halbrook_30 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:17 PM 
December 2013]         JUVENILE PARIAHS 39 
 
juveniles and adults receive the same sentence, the effect of the sentence 
is more severe for juveniles due to their age.292 
Finally, the Court evaluated whether a sentence of life without 
parole for non-homicide crimes served legitimate penological goals.293 
For each possibility, the immaturity and mutable characteristics of youth 
undermined the goal.294 The Court categorically forbade life-without-the-
possibility-of-parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders, 
recognizing that recent scientific and social science evidence showed that 
youths’ brains are fundamentally different from adults’ brains and that 
youth are therefore categorically less culpable.295 
Importantly, the Court in Graham noted that in order for a life 
penalty to be constitutional, states must give a juvenile defendant “some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation.”296 While a juvenile may turn out to be “irredeemable,” 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from “making [that] judgment at 
the outset.”297 
Since Graham, courts follow a two-part analysis to decide whether 
to adopt a categorical rule regarding punishments: (1) whether there is a 
national consensus against the practice, and (2) whether, in the court’s 
independent judgment, the punishment in question violates the 
Constitution.298 The Eighth Amendment is “interpreted according to its 
text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent.”299 Roper and 
Graham both hold that a juvenile’s reduced culpability makes them “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.”300 Courts imposing categorical 
rules apply Roper and Graham to ensure that juveniles’ decency, 
culpability, and ability to demonstrate maturity and reform are factored 
into the sentencing scheme.301 
c. Miller v. Alabama 
In June 2012, the Court in Miller v. Alabama held that a judge or 
jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances 
before imposing life without parole, the harshest penalty possible for 
juveniles.302 Therefore, a state law mandating juvenile life without parole, 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 2031–34. 
 294. Id. at 2031–33. 
 295. Id. at 2026, 2034. 
 296. Id. at 2030. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 2033; see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 299. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 300. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.  
 301. Id. 
 302. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). 
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absent consideration of a juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and greater 
“capacity for change,” is unconstitutional.303 
Miller involved two cases from Alabama and Arkansas concerning 
two fourteen year-old boys who were “convicted of murder and 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”304 The 
first case involved Kuntrell Jackson, who stood outside a store as his 
friend shot and killed a store clerk.305 He was charged with and convicted 
of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery.306 The Arkansas 
Supreme Court rejected Jackson’s Eighth Amendment arguments based 
on Roper and Graham, finding that those cases were narrowly tailored to 
their specific contexts.307 
The second case involved Evan Miller, who struck a person with a 
baseball bat, and then, with a friend, lit two fires in the person’s trailer.308 
The victim died from injuries and smoke inhalation.309 The case was 
transferred to adult court, and Miller was convicted for murder in the 
course of arson and sentenced to life without parole, which was a 
mandatory sentence.310 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed, holding that “life without parole was ‘not overly harsh when 
compared to the crime’ and that the mandatory nature of the sentencing 
scheme was permissible under the Eighth Amendment.”311 
The Supreme Court examined the Eighth Amendment issue 
through the lens of “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”312 In addition, the Court relied on two 
strands of precedent related to the need for proportionate punishment.313 
First, the Court specifically considered the developmental findings in 
Roper and Graham. Highlighting children’s lack of maturity, vulnerability 
to outside influences, and more retrievable character, the Court declared 
that “Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have 
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . ‘they are less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.’”314 Examining the mandatory 
 
 303. Id. at 2460. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 2461. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 2462. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 246263. 
 311. Id. (quoting Miller v State, 63 So. 3d 676, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)). 
 312. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
 313. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012); see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 
(2008). 
 314. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)). 
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penalty schemes at issue in Miller, the Court found that they “prevent 
the sentencer from taking account of these central considerations.”315 The 
Court noted that failing to consider adolescent development when 
applying a penalty prohibits the trial court from properly assessing the 
proportionality of punishment for the juvenile offender.316 
Second, the Court considered a line of cases involving mandatory 
sentences for youth.317 These rulings required that a sentencer factor in 
the “mitigating qualities of youth.”318 The Court highlighted that 
mandatory sentencing schemes without consideration of mitigating 
circumstances are harmful to juveniles because each juvenile would 
receive the same sentence as another juvenile, without acknowledgment 
of the differences between “the shooter and the accomplice, the child 
from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one.”319 
Upon analysis, the Court held that Roper, Graham, and individualized 
sentencing in capital cases320 show that imposing permanent mandatory 
sentences on juveniles, absent an assessment of “age . . . immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences” ignores the 
circumstances of the offense, “including the extent of [the juvenile’s] 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may 
have affected [the juvenile].”321 In addition, mandatory sentencing 
disregards any possibility of rehabilitation.322 The Court stated that “the 
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” because there 
is too great a risk of disproportionate punishment by subjecting youth to 
the harshest prison sentence.323 
Further, the Court declared that because of decisions about children’s 
“diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,” sentencing 
juveniles to the harshest possible penalty “will be uncommon.”324 Lastly, 
the Court required that a sentencer take into account “how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably 
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”325 With this, the Court extended 
 
 315. Id. at 2466. 
 316. Id. at 2467. (discussing prior decisions that showed “the flaws of imposing mandatory life-
without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offenders”); see Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13 (2002). 
 317. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 2467–68. 
 320. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976). 
 321. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 2469. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
1. Halbrook_30 (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:17 PM 
42 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1 
 
the rationale from Roper and Graham to mandatory lifetime sentences—
highlighting that the same characteristics that would make youth less 
culpable require that their sentences be subject to review.326 
B. Examples from States: Promising Eighth Amendment Juvenile 
Cases Since SORNA Implementation 
When the Supreme Court considers whether juvenile sex offender 
registration requirements constitute cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court will analyze “evolving standards of 
decency” as part of its proportionality discussion.327 When the Court 
considers evolving standards of decency, it considers whether there is a 
national consensus against the penalty in question.328 As stated above, the 
criteria used to evaluate whether national consensus supports a challenged 
sentence are (1) legislative enactments enabling the sentencing practice, 
and (2) actual use of the practice.329 Considerations include whether the 
punishment has been rejected in most jurisdictions, and whether it is used 
frequently when allowed, as well as specific characteristics of the 
offender.330 
Currently, while every jurisdiction in America requires some juvenile 
sex offenders to register, only six require mandatory lifetime registration 
(additional states allow lifetime registration for certain offenses) and only 
twenty-five require community notification.331 Moreover, legislative action 
and judicial decisionmaking in various jurisdictions—discussed in Parts 
IV.B and VI, infra—illustrate a move toward a consensus that mandatory 
registration is cruel and unusual for juveniles. 
 
 326. Id. 
 327. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 328. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005). 
 329. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).  
 330. Id. 
 331. Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 8, 32. Litigators have already begun challenging sex 
offender registration statutes as applied to juveniles post-Miller. In Pennsylvania, for example, six 
juveniles challenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act. See York County SORNA Challenge, Juvenile Law Center, http://www.jlc.org/legal-
docket/york-county-sorna-challenge. On November 4, 2013, the Court of Common Pleas of York 
County, Pennsylvania held that mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles violated the 
Pennsylvania and U.S. constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In re J.B. et al., No. CP-
67-JV-0726-2010 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Nov. 4, 2013), available at http://www.jlc.org/blog/juvenile-
court-judge-finds-pennsylvania-juvenile-sex-offender-registration-law-unconstitutional. 
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1. Ohio:332 Mandatory Lifetime Registration for Juveniles 
Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Ohio’s sex offender registry was originally implemented in 1963.333 A 
1996 amendment created a three-category classification system: sexually 
oriented offenders; habitual sexual offenders; and sexual predators.334 In 
Ohio, juveniles adjudicated delinquent or convicted as adults for sex 
offenses are subject to registration requirements.335 
Ohio was the first state to come into substantial compliance with 
SORNA.336 Before this compliance, Ohio’s registration scheme allowed 
for judicial discretion in placing juveniles on the registry and, 
acknowledging In re C.P. and Miller, assigning classification.337 It also 
provided a means for juveniles to be removed from the registry.338 
Ohio had initial compliance difficulties because of its different 
approach to applying registration and community notification 
requirements to juveniles.339 Initially, the SMART Board determined that 
Ohio’s proposed scheme was too lenient on juveniles because it excluded 
certain low-level offenses from mandatory registration.340 The issue of 
community notification was resolved when the guidelines were amended 
to allow states discretion to decide whether to make juveniles’ identifying 
information available to the public.341 The Ohio scheme was eventually 
deemed substantially compliant in September 2009.342 
SORNA compliance changed how juveniles were assigned to tiers.343 
Under the prior statutory scheme, the determination of tier assignment 
in Ohio was based on various factors and the courts maintained 
discretion. After Ohio complied with SORNA, tier assignment was now 
 
 332. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950 (West 2013); 
Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and Notification, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.82–99 (West 2013); 
Children Subject to Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.191. 
 333. State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 574 (Ohio 1998); see H.R. 180, 124th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 
2002) (codified as amended at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.28, 2151.31). 
 334. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.01; see H.R. 180, 124th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2002). 
 335. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.82. 
 336. Ohio Senate Bill 10 amended Ohio Revised Code section 2950 by reclassifying sex offenders 
into tiers based on offense, increasing frequency and duration of registration requirements, increasing 
community notification requirements, expanding residency restrictions, and increasing penalties for 
non-compliance with registry requirements. S. 10, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ohio 2003) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Ohio Rev. Code Ann.) (listing Jan. 1, 2008, as the 
projected date of substantial compliance). 
 337. Id. § 2950.09(B)(3)(a)–(j). 
 338. Id. § 2152.83. 
 339. SMART Website, supra note 159. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Supplemental Guidelines, supra note 146, at 1631–32. 
 342. SMART Website, supra note 159. 
 343. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.80. 
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based on the crime committed.344 The new registration scheme provided 
that a juvenile would only be subjected to a registration requirement if 
he or she was at least fourteen years of age at the time of the offense, and 
the offense was committed on or after January 1, 2002.345 Certain 
juveniles were automatically classified as Public Registry Qualified 
Juvenile Offender Registrants (“PRQJORs”) based on the offense 
committed and are assigned lifelong mandatory public registration.346  
Under the new Ohio registration scheme, the juvenile court 
maintained discretion to order registration requirements for certain 
juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent, but not for PRQJORs. The 
new scheme imposed a number of requirements in order for the juvenile 
court judge to exercise any discretion: (1) the juvenile had to be fourteen 
or fifteen years of age at the time of the offense, (2) the juvenile could 
not have been previously adjudicated delinquent for a sexually oriented 
or child-victim oriented offense, and (3) the court was not required to 
classify an individual as a Juvenile Offender Registrant (“JOR”) or a 
JOR and a PRQJOR.347 In cases where the court was allowed to use its 
discretion, it was to consider the nature of the offense, whether the child 
has shown any remorse for the offense, public interest and safety, the 
results of any treatment, and any professional assessments submitted to 
the court.348 If the court decided to classify the juvenile as a JOR, it was 
required to conduct a hearing to determine tier classification. After the 
hearings, a fourteen or fifteen year old may be classified as a JOR or both 
a JOR and PRQJOR.349 
Juveniles aged sixteen or seventeen were subjected to stricter 
requirements. A juvenile was assigned to a tier if (1) the juvenile was 
sixteen or seventeen at the time of the offense; (2) the offense was 
committed on or after January 1, 2002; and (3) the court was not 
required to automatically classify the juvenile as a PRQJOR.350 A sixteen 
or seventeen year old was classified as a registrant if the juvenile was 
previously adjudicated delinquent for committing any sexual offense or 
 
 344. This change was significant for many registrants who were reclassified based on the new 
scheme. See, e.g., State v. Roey, No. 97484, 2012 WL 1758700, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 17, 2012) 
(finding the juvenile delinquent and requiring registration for ten years as a juvenile sexually oriented 
offender was reclassified as a Tier III offender, requiring lifetime registration). 
 345. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.82(a)(1). 
 346. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1008, 1110 (Ohio 2011); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.83. 
 347. PRQJOR classification applies to juveniles fourteen or older adjudicated delinquent for: rape, 
sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, aggravated murder with sexual motivation, murder with sexual 
motivation, and kidnapping with sexual motivation. See Ohio Att’y Gen. Office, JSORN After 1-1-
08 (2007). 
 348. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2152.83(D)(1)–(6). 
 349. Id. § 2152.83(A)–(B). 
 350. Id. § 2152.831. 
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any offense involving a child victim, regardless of when the prior offense 
was committed and regardless of the child’s age at the time of 
committing the offense.351 The minimum age for registration was 
fourteen, and registry information was on a public website.352 Juveniles 
with PRQJOR status were prohibited from occupying a residence within 
1000 feet of a school, preschool, or childcare center.353 
For these older juveniles, tier classification was based on the offense 
for which the juvenile was adjudicated.354 A juvenile was required to 
register for ten years under Tier 1, twenty years under Tier II, and for life 
under Tier III.355 While non-PRQJORs had the ability to be reclassified 
or declassified as soon as the initial classification hearing, a PRQJOR 
was eligible to petition the court for reclassification or registry 
termination only after twenty-five years of a clean record.356 
In April 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down the 
requirement that PRQJORs be subject to mandatory registration, 
community notification, and online searchable database (including 
photo, name, address, and criminal histories), opining that it was cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions 
and also a violation of due process.357 Performing a proportionality 
analysis and citing a growing national consensus against imposing 
automatic lifetime registration requirements on juvenile sex offenders,358 
the court noted that Ohio’s law created a new class of juvenile sex 
offenders who were automatically required to register for the rest of 
their lives, with an opportunity to be reclassified twenty-five years after 
their registration requirements began.359 The automatic classification 
differed from the traditional process of holding a juvenile court hearing 
to determine the sex offender’s classification.360 Focusing on the 
 
 351. Id. § 2152.83(A)(1)(b). 
 352. Id. § 2152.86. 
 353. Id. § 2950.034(A). 
 354. Id. § 2152.83(2). 
 355. See In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 750 (Ohio 2012) (holding automatic lifetime registration for 
juveniles is unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. Ohio courts had previously held that Ohio Senate Bill 10 (reclassifying sex offenders into 
tiers) did not constitute excessive punishment or cruel and unusual punishment as applied to adults. 
See, e.g., State v. Byers, No. 07 CO 39, 2008 WL 4416519, at *15 ¶ 77 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008) 
(“As long as R.C. Chapter 2950 is viewed as civil, and not criminal—remedial and not punitive—then 
the period of registration cannot be viewed as punishment. Accordingly, it logically follows that it does 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment since the punishment element is lacking.”). 
 358. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 739. 
 359. Id. at 734. 
 360. Id. at 736. 
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elimination of a juvenile court judge’s discretion, the majority found the 
scheme to be unconstitutional.361 
Citing Graham, the court noted that Ohio has a juvenile court system 
that assumes children are less culpable than adults.362 Because “[j]uveniles 
are more capable of change than adults,”363 and are amenable to 
rehabilitation, they “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders” deserving the most severe penalties.364 In addition, juveniles 
who do not kill are “categorically less deserving of the most serious 
forms of punishment” with “twice diminished moral culpability” related 
to age and the nature of the offense.365 
The court reviewed the severity of the offense compared to the 
punishment366 and noted that “[r]egistration and notification requirements 
for life, with the possibility of having them lifted only after 25 years, are 
especially harsh punishments for a juvenile.”367 In addition, the court 
recognized that a registration period is longer for a juvenile than an adult 
because juveniles are younger at the time they have to begin 
registering.368 The court noted that for juveniles, “the length of the 
punishment is extraordinary, and it is imposed at an age when the 
character of the offender is not yet fixed.”369 The court found the 
imposition extreme and developmentally detrimental.370 The court noted 
that: 
Registration and notification necessarily involve stigmatization. For a 
juvenile offender, the stigma of the label attaches at the start of his 
adult life and cannot be shaken. With no other offense is the juvenile’s 
wrongdoing announced to the world. Before a juvenile can even begin 
his adult life, before he has a chance to live on his own, the world will 
know of his offense. He will never have a chance to establish a good 
character in the community. He will be hampered in his education, in 
his relationships, and in his work life. His potential will be squelched 
before it has a chance to show itself. A juvenile—one who remains 
under the authority of the juvenile court and has thus been ajudged 
redeemable—who is subject to sex-offender notification will have his 
entire life evaluated through the prism of his juvenile adjudication. It 
will be a constant cloud, a once-every-three-month reminder to himself 
and the world that he cannot escape the mistakes of his youth. A youth 
released at 18 would have to wait until age 43 at the earliest to gain a 
 
 361. Id. at 748. 
 362. Id. at 750. 
 363. Id. at 740 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010)). 
 364. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005)). 
 365. Id. at 741 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 742  
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fresh start. While not a harsh penalty to a career criminal used to 
spending time in a penitentiary, a lifetime or even 25-year requirement 
of community notification means everything to a juvenile. It will define 
his adult life before it has a chance to truly begin.371 
Next, the court considered whether there were penological 
justifications for imposing mandatory lifetime registration. It noted that 
the juvenile court’s goals are rehabilitative, while lifetime registration 
and community notification undermine rehabilitation by anchoring the 
juvenile to his crime.372 In addition, the system of assigning mandatory 
sentences based on violation, rather than risk, removes judicial discretion 
so that there is no way of knowing whether the public safety is 
protected.373 
Finally, the court considered the goals of penal sanctions: 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.374 It found that 
retribution was inappropriate because the “sentence must be directly 
related to the personal culpability” of the offender and juveniles are 
categorically less culpable due to developmental issues.375 Deterrence was 
inappropriate because juveniles are less able to anticipate consequences 
due to their “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility.”376 Additionally, it noted that rehabilitation was actually 
hampered by registration and notification due to social and economic 
considerations.377 When taken together, the court found that penological 
theory was “not adequate to justify” imposition of lifetime registration 
and notification.378 
In sum, the court found that the requirement that PRQJORs be 
subject to mandatory registration and community notification constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment because the penalty was not proportionate 
to the crime.379 The court noted that the lack of proportionality was 
evidenced by the lifetime and public nature of the penalty. Juvenile court 
proceedings are supposed to be confidential to allow a young person to 
avoid stigma, but registration and notification undermined these goals.380 
As many courts had done before, the dissent argued that the 
registration requirements were not subject to an Eighth Amendment 
 
 371. Id. at 741–42. 
 372. Id. at 742. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 742–743. 
 376. Id. at 743 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010)). 
 377. Id. (noting that the registration status creates economic impact because registrants are not 
able to get jobs that require background checks and that disclosure of registry status inspires 
vigilantism, shaming, ostracism, housing instability, and employment instability). 
 378. Id. at 744 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030).  
 379. Id. at 745. 
 380. Id. 
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challenge because registries are civil in nature and not punishment.381 It 
noted that Eighth Amendment challenges are extremely rare and argued 
that in this case, the disproportionality between the punishment and the 
severity of the crime was not significant enough to be grossly 
disproportionate.382 The dissent reasoned that a juvenile’s age and 
immaturity should be considered but should not be used as an excuse.383 
More recently, Ohio Senator Bill Seitz introduced legislation 
seeking to bring Ohio’s SORNA into compliance with the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s decision in In re C.P. and other cases.384 Subsequent cases dealing 
with juvenile sex offender registration have followed.385 
 
 381. The Ohio Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of whether the registration scheme 
constitutes punishment in other contexts. For example, in State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 
(Ohio 2011), the court held that the new registration scheme’s retroactivity provisions crossed the line 
between remedial and punitive action in violation of the Ohio Constitution’s ex post facto laws. The 
court reasoned that (1) the sexual predator label was permanent for adult offenders, (2) registration 
requirements were much more demanding and could no longer be likened to renewing a driver’s 
license, (3) community notification had expanded to the extent that virtually all information about the 
offender was public record and much of it available on the internet, (4) new restrictions under the law 
prevented all sex offenders, not just those convicted of crimes against children, from living within 1000 
feet of a school, and finally, (5) under the new law a sheriff could request that a landlord verify a sex 
offender currently lived at the registered address. Id. at 1111–12. Under the new law offenders had to 
personally register with the sheriff in the county they reside, work, and go to school. Id. at 1111. This 
was potentially interaction with three different sheriffs every ninety days. In addition, the Ohio 
Supreme Court previously held that it was significant that the information provided to the sheriff 
under the old law could be disseminated to only a restricted group of people. State v. Cook, 700 
N.E.2d 570, 582 (Ohio 1998). The requests of verification from a landlord by the sheriff could be made 
an unlimited number of times. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1112. For these reasons, the Court determined 
that it could no longer find the provisions of the law civil in nature, stating that “[t]hese restraints on 
liberty are the consequences of specific criminal convictions and should be recognized as part of the 
punishment that is imposed as a result of the offenders’ actions.” Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 865 
N.E.2d 1264, 1274 (Ohio 2007) (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The court 
unequivocally held that “[f]ollowing the enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been removed: R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is punitive.” Id. 
 382. In re C.P. 967 N.E.2d at 757 (Cupp, J., dissenting). 
 383. Id. (Cupp, J., dissenting). 
 384. Ohio Senate Bill 144 seeks to adjust the law to reflect the court’s decisions in Hyle v. Porter, 
882 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio 2008), State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 2010), Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 
1108, In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 745, State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch, 983 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2012), 
and State v. Howard, 983 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio 2012). See S. 144, 130th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2013). 
 385. See, e.g., In re Raheem L., No. C-100608, 2013 WL 2647683, *3–*4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 12, 
2013) (upholding provision requiring registration beyond a juvenile defendant’s twenty-first birthday). 
The dissent argued that the provision violated juveniles’ due process rights because it compelled 
juvenile court judges to automatically impose adult sentences and eliminated the opportunity for 
judges to review the youth’s response to treatment and rehabilitation before determining that an adult 
penalty was appropriate. Id. at *5–*6 (Cunningham, P.J., dissenting). 
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2. Michigan:386 Lifetime Registration with Notification Constitutes 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment as Applied to Romeo and Juliet 
Cases 
As of 2011, more than 3500 people appeared on the Michigan sex 
offender registry for offenses committed as juveniles.387 In Michigan, both 
juveniles adjudicated delinquent and juveniles convicted as adults for sex 
offenses are required to register.388 Some exceptions apply for juveniles 
assigned “Youth Trainee Status” for young people who successfully 
complete a probation program.389 Juveniles assigned to particular tiers 
are required to register for ten or twenty-five years after release.390 
In People v. Dipiazza, two high school students had a consensual 
relationship which, incidentally, led to marriage and a child.391 When the 
boy was eighteen and the girl was fifteen, a teacher found a photograph 
of them in bed together with the boy’s hand on the girl’s breast.392 The 
teens’ parents were aware of the nature of their relationship.393 The 
teacher notified the prosecuting attorney.394 The boy was adjudicated 
delinquent for “attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct” and was 
sentenced to probation and sex offender registration.395 After the boy 
successfully completed his probation, his case was dismissed and erased, 
but he remained required to publicly register.396 
On appeal, the boy’s attorney argued that financial and emotional 
consequences of registration constituted cruel and unusual punishment.397 
The court examined an earlier Michigan case, In re Ayres, that held that 
requiring a juvenile offender to register was not punishment.398 The Ayres 
court had noted 
 
 386. The Michigan Sex Offender Registration statute can be found at Sex Offenders Registration 
Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.721–28.736 (2013). 
 387. Pittman Report, supra note 15, at 25. 
 388. Mich Comp. Laws §§ 28.721a–722, 28.722(b)(ii)(A)–(B), (b)(iii), 28.723. 
 389. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.721–736. The Holmes Youthful trainee Act (“HYTA”) allows 
individuals aged seventeen to twenty one to participate in a probation program. Id. § 762.11. If they 
comply with the program, their conviction does not appear on a public registry. Id. § 762.13. A person 
assigned to HYTA before October 1, 2004 must comply with sex offender registration requirements 
and continue to register. They may petition the court for registry termination after ten years. Id. 
§ 762.13(c)(6). 
 390. Id. §§ 78.725(11), (12). 
 391. People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. 2009). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 273. 
 394. Id. at 266. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. In re Ayres, 608 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
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In light of the existence of strict statutory safeguards that protect the 
confidentiality of registration data concerning juvenile sex offenders, 
we conclude that the registration required imposed by the act, as it 
pertains to juveniles, neither “punishes” respondent nor offends a basic 
premise of the juvenile justice system—that a reformed adult should 
not have to carry the burden of a continuing stigma for youthful 
offenses. The confidential collection and maintenance of juvenile 
offender registration data by law enforcement authorities serves an 
important remedial function and is not so punitive in form and effect as 
to render it unconstitutional “punishment” under [the Michigan 
Constitution].399 
The Dipiazza court questioned the applicability of Ayres because 
Ayres was decided before juveniles’ registry information was publicly 
available.400 The court noted that the essential underpinning of Ayres was 
that the registration requirement did not punish because strict statutory 
guidelines protected juvenile registrants’ confidentiality, and 
acknowledged that this premise was no longer valid.401  
The court first considered whether requiring juveniles to register 
constituted punishment.402 The court considered “the totality of 
circumstances, and particularly (1) legislative intent, (2) design of the 
legislation, (3) historical treatment of analogous measures, and (4) effects 
of the legislation.”403 The court held that the implied purpose of the sex 
offender registration statute—public safety—was not served by requiring 
an otherwise law abiding adult to be forever branded a sex offender.404 
The court concluded, “given the totality of the circumstances . . . the 
registration requirement under SORNA, as applied to defendant, 
constitutes punishment.”405 
The court then determined whether the punishment was cruel and 
unusual. The court noted that the offense was not grave, but the 
punishment was harsh—that requiring the defendant to register was 
keeping him from being employed.406 “[A]fter considering the gravity of 
the offense, the harshness of the penalty, a comparison of the penalty to 
penalties imposed for the same offense in other states, and the goal of 
rehabilitation,”407 the court concluded that requiring the defendant to 
 
 399. Id. at 139. 
 400. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 269. 
 401. Id. (citing In re Wentworth, 651 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)).  
 402. Id. at 270. 
 403. Id. at 270–73; see In re Ayres, 608 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 
1108 (W.D. Mich. 1997)). 
 404. Id. at 271. 
 405. Id. at 273. 
 406. Id.  
 407. Id. at 274. 
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register as a sex offender for ten years constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.408 
Subsequent to this case, Michigan signed into law a provision that 
addresses Romeo and Juliet situations and will allow some offenders to 
be removed from, or be able to avoid, registration.409 
V.  Applying an Eighth Amendment Analysis to Mandatory 
Lifetime Registration, Community Notification, and Restrictions, 
Post-MILLER 
 Assuming it can be proven that mandatory lifetime registration 
for juveniles constitutes punishment for the purposes of the Ex Post 
Facto clause, the Court must then determine whether the punishment is 
cruel and unusual. In re C.P. provides a promising analytical model that 
could be applied in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Miller—decided after In re C.P.—can only bolster an Eighth 
Amendment argument.  
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provides that 
“punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to . . . the 
offense.”410 Mandatory lifetime registration is a disproportionate 
punishment and an impermissibly permanent punishment.  
The Court “implements the proportionality standard by certain 
categorical restrictions . . . considering the nature of the offense . . . [and] 
the characteristics of the offender.”411 When adopting categorical rules 
related to punishment, the Court considers whether there is national 
consensus against a sentencing practice and then considers whether, in its 
independent judgment, the practice violates the Constitution.412 The 
Court’s exercise of independent judgment requires “consideration of the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics,” the severity of the punishment, and whether the practice 
serves legitimate penological goals.413 
There is no national consensus related to whether and how juvenile 
registration is imposed.414 Practices vary widely from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. While national consideration of a sentencing practice is not 
determinative, and not based on the need for particular numbers or 
 
 408. Id. But cf. In re T.D., 823 N.W.2d 101, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011), vacated as moot, 
821 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Mich. 2011). 
 409. In re T.D., 821 N.W.2d at 570. 
 410. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012) (internal references omitted). 
 411. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 202122 (2010). 
 412. Id. at 2022. 
 413. Id. at 2026. 
 414. See supra Part III.C. 
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ratios,415 it is significant that mandatory lifetime sex offender registration 
and related restrictions are imposed on juveniles in a limited number of 
jurisdictions.416  
When considering the nature of the characteristics of the offender, 
the Court in Miller noted that a youth’s age is relevant for Eighth 
Amendment purposes and must be taken into consideration.417 While 
some registration schemes may provide certain protections for 
juveniles—such as registry termination provisions—juveniles are 
generally not treated differently than adults for purposes of registration. 
In Graham, the Court stated that while a serious offense like rape is 
“a serious crime deserving serious punishment,” it is not the same as a 
homicide crime in a moral sense.418 Registerable sex offenses—whether 
minor or comparatively serious—are not as serious as crimes that have 
been deemed the most egregious and deserving of the most severe 
punishments.419 
The requirement of lifetime registration is actually worse for 
juveniles than adults because youth are on the registry longer due to 
their age.420 As discussed in Part IV.B.1, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court 
in In re C.P. described seriousness of the penalty: “A juvenile—one who 
remains under the authority of the juvenile court and has thus been 
deemed redeemable—who is subject to sex offender notification will 
have his entire life evaluated through the prism of his juvenile 
adjudication.”421 
The purpose and effects of punishments are relevant to whether a 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment; any sentence “lacking any 
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate.”422 Applying 
mandatory lifetime registration to juveniles does not serve any 
penological goal. Juvenile status undermines the justifications behind 
each goal because of a youth’s developmental limitations.423 Because of a 
youth’s diminished culpability, any argument for retribution is less 
compelling for a youth than it would be for an adult.424 Lack of maturity 
undermines the goal of deterrence; juveniles act recklessly and are less 
likely than adults to consider potential punishments before committing 
 
 415. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 247172 (noting that the Court prohibited sentences of life without 
the possibility of parole even though thirty-nine jurisdictions allowed the practice). 
 416. See generally Pittman Report, supra note 15. 
 417. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 418. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. at 2028. 
 421. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 74142 (Ohio 2012). 
 422. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 423. Id. at 2026. 
 424. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005). 
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crimes.425 In addition, by imposing restrictions and community 
notification, sex offender schemes undermine rehabilitation and create 
barriers for youth to participate fully in society. The punishment is 
excessively punitive because of the emotional and social toll; the 
shaming; the isolation it creates by restricting housing, employment, and 
family life; and the fact that the requirement remains in place despite the 
fact that juveniles are amenable to treatment and may, at some point, no 
longer pose any risk to the community.426  
In Miller, the Court stated that it must consider the “mitigating 
qualities of youth” when applying a sentence and must account for 
youths’ developmental status.427 Sentences must be individualized.428 
Imposing a permanent penalty without considering “immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”429 is 
impermissible. The same characteristics that make juveniles less culpable 
than adults require their sentences to be subject to review.430  
The practice of imposing mandatory lifetime sex offender 
registration runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Miller 
(and Roper and Graham before it). Miller extended the definition of 
“most severe” punishments to include permanent non-capital 
punishments.431 Mandatory lifetime registration is such a punishment—
the juvenile court judge is not permitted to consider the individual 
characteristics when assigning registration requirements and is not 
permitted to give the registrant an opportunity to prove that he or she 
has been rehabilitated. This failure to take developmental status into 
account is impermissible. 
When taken together, these factors support the argument that 
mandatory lifetime registration, community notification, and restrictions 
as applied to juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 
VI.  Going Forward 
Juvenile advocates play an important role in shaping the legal and 
public discourse around juvenile sex offender registration, as they did 
with the juvenile death penalty and life without parole. The question now 
is what can be done to improve the likelihood that the practice be 
banned in the interest of youth and society? 
 
 425. Id. at 571. 
 426. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 117 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 427. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012). 
 428. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 429. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 430. Id. at 2469. 
 431. See id. at 2475. 
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The road ahead seems clear: states that have adopted strict schemes 
must pull back their registry requirements for juveniles (possibly 
including judicial discretion, individualized risk assessment, and a 
registry termination process), or there is likely to be another Eighth 
Amendment battle in the Supreme Court related to juveniles. To the 
extent possible, juvenile advocates should work toward building a 
national consensus that juvenile sex offender registration constitutes 
punishment before the Supreme Court reviews the issue. The strategy for 
building consensus should include at least three parts: policy 
development, litigation strategy, and social science research. 
A. Policy Development 
Illinois is a good example of a jurisdiction where juvenile advocates 
have effectively helped shape juvenile sex offender policy. Following a 
constitutional challenge to juvenile registration as a violation of 
substantive due process and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment post-Roper, the Illinois Supreme Court held in 2003 
that lifetime juvenile sex offender registration did not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment.432 The court ruled that no rights were affected, 
nor was registration cruel and unusual punishment, partially because 
strict limits are placed on access to juveniles’ confidential information in 
Illinois.433 In a special concurrence, Justice McMorrow recognized the 
tension between the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court and the 
practice of imposing lifetime registration on juveniles, and invited the 
Illinois legislature to “reconsider the wisdom of imposing such a burden 
on juveniles, particularly juveniles under the age of 13.”434 
In response, the Illinois legislature considered empirical research 
related to juvenile sex offenders and ultimately designed a process 
whereby people on the registry for juvenile sex offenses may petition the 
court for registry termination after a designated period of time.435 
 
 432. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 759–60 (Ill. 2003). The Illinois Supreme Court held that 
(1) requiring a juvenile to register for the rest of his life did not violate substantive due process, id. at 
757–60, (2) the registration requirement was not punishment and, thus, did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment or the Double Jeopardy Clause, id. at 761–62, (3) probation condition that prohibited the 
juvenile from residing in his home for any purpose was unconstitutionally overbroad, id. at 765, and 
(4) juvenile sex offenders are included within the larger category of sex offenders required to register, 
id. at 756. 
 433. Id. at 759–60. 
 434. Id. at 767 (McMorrow, C.J., specially concurring) (“The public safety concerns which animate 
the registration and notification laws should be harmonized with our traditional understanding of the 
need to protect and rehabilitate the young citizens of this state.”). 
 435.  The Illinois legislature brought forth House Bill 2067 in 2006. H.B. 2067, 94th Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill. 2006). It proposed that a judge should determine if a juvenile should register and if so, for what 
duration. Id. § 3–5(c). The State’s Attorney would have to petition the court to continue a juvenile’s 
registration term. The State’s Attorney would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
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Still, tensions continued. Despite approving a termination provision 
in 1999, the Illinois legislature continued to attempt to revise registration 
and community notification requirements for juveniles. For example, in 
an attempt to come into compliance with SORNA in 2011,436 Senate 
Bill 1040 proposed to increase the registration term for some offenses 
from ten to twenty-five years, added additional registerable offenses, 
increased the number of times per year that many juveniles had to 
register in person from one to four, and penalized a conviction for 
violating the Sex Offender Registry Act by extending the registry term to 
natural life.437 In addition, the legislature proposed that some non-sexual 
offenses that required registration on the Child Murderer and Violent 
Offender Registry be moved to the sex offender registry.438 
Visible and concerned juvenile advocates—attorneys, social workers, 
and mental health professionals—spoke out against the revisions to the 
bill,439 slowed down the legislative process, and put it to committee to 
discuss the developmental and financial implications of the bill and 
whether the registration revisions were appropriate, particularly as applied 
to juveniles. Ultimately, the Bill did not pass and Illinois is still not 
compliant with SORNA.440 
As state legislatures continue to introduce bills to come into 
substantial compliance with SORNA, juvenile advocates should take 
similar action in their respective states: frame the conversation in terms 
of adolescent development; use the available social science; educate 
 
the juvenile posed a serious risk to the community. Id. § 3–5(d). It did not pass. In 2008, the legislature 
brought forth another bill, Senate Bill 121. S. 121, 95th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2008). The bill placed the 
burden on the juvenile to petition the court to terminate his or her registration. Id. § 3–5(c). The Judge 
can terminate registry requirements after a specified period of time if the juvenile proves that he or 
she poses no risk to the community by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 3–5(d). The bill 
succeeded, in part because the legislature knew that SORNA would go into effect in 2009 and would 
be harsher. Pub. Act. 95-0658 (codified at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/2, 150/3, 150/3–5). It would comfort 
those who feared the legislators weren’t being tough on crime. In addition, it harmonized the safety 
concerns with the need to rehabilitate youth. Currently, the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act 
allows people to petition the court for registry termination two years after a juvenile adjudication for a 
misdemeanor offense and five years after a juvenile adjudication for a felony offense. 730 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 150/3–5(c) (2013). The court considers several factors, including the results of a sex offender risk 
assessment; the petitioner’s sex offender history; evidence of rehabilitation; information related to the 
petitioner’s mental, physical, educational and social history, and effect on the victim. See 730 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 150/3–5(e). 
 436. Illinois filed for an extension until July 2011 to come into substantial compliance, and thus 
receive its full Byrne funds. Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, 
Registering, & Tracking, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, SORNA Extensions Granted (2010). 
 437. S. 1040, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011). 
 438. Id. § 7. These included kidnapping and are required under SORNA. See SORNA § 111(4)(B). 
 439. Illinois Legislators Debate Costly Expansion of Sex Offender Registry, Randolph County 
Herald Trib. 1 (Mar. 19, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.randolphcountyheraldtribune.com/article/ 
20120319/NEWS/303199899. 
 440. SMART Website, supra note 159. 
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legislators; and inform the media. The fewer states that come into 
compliance with SORNA, and the longer it takes the ones that do to do 
so, the more likely that advocates can establish a national consensus 
against the practice of placing juveniles on registries. 
In jurisdictions where the registration schemes are already overly 
broad, advocates should work to influence legislators to enact more 
youth-appropriate schemes. When asked by legislators what would work 
instead of the SORNA model, juvenile advocates should inform them 
about social and brain science-driven best practices applied to juveniles. 
When arguing for revised sex offender registration schemes, juvenile 
advocates should argue, based on Miller, that juveniles should not be 
subject to mandatory lifetime sex offender registration. Second, if 
registration requirements apply to juveniles at all, judges should have 
discretion to decide whether each juvenile must register and for how 
long. Third, courts should conduct individualized empirically-validated 
risk assessments before assigning registration requirements; if juveniles 
pose no risk, or if registration would not improve public safety, juveniles 
should not be required to register. Fourth, if juveniles are required to 
register, every jurisdiction should adopt a registry termination provision 
that enables the juvenile to petition the court within a reasonable period 
of time, and juveniles should be appointed counsel for such petitions. 
Fifth, juvenile registrants should not be subject to housing or movement 
restrictions because this practice isolates them from their families, which 
in turn undermines rehabilitation. Finally, community notification 
requirements for juveniles should be eliminated. Publicly identifying 
youth registrants undermines rehabilitation, puts them at risk, and 
violates confidentiality under state juvenile justice policies.  
B. Litigation Strategy 
When thinking about litigation strategy, juvenile advocates should 
consider bringing Eighth Amendment challenges in jurisdictions that 
impose significantly more onerous restrictions on juveniles than the 
federal law requires (for example, those with GPS tracking or public 
notification by billboard) and those with state constitutions that are less 
demanding than the federal Constitution when it comes to cruel and 
unusual punishment (cruel or unusual441 instead of cruel and unusual). 
Any victory in these states aids in the development of a national 
consensus that juvenile registration unconstitutional. 
In re C.P. offers a promising model for challenging juvenile sex 
offender registration on Eighth Amendment and other constitutional 
 
 441. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 1, § 17; Mich. Const. art. 1, § 16. For a more comprehensive list of 
state constitutions, see Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice 205 App. F (1991). 
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grounds. The Ohio court in In re C.P. relied heavily on Graham and 
noted a growing national consensus that juvenile sex offender 
registration is inappropriate.442 Eighth Amendment arguments made in 
state cases would be additionally bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miller, which focuses on the requirement of individualized 
review for juveniles. 
When bringing challenges to state juvenile sex offender registration 
schemes, litigants should focus on the reasons why registration and 
community notification constitute punishment as applied to juveniles, 
likely using Ex Post Facto cases, and why that punishment is cruel and 
unusual. In states with mandatory lifetime registration without the 
possibility of review (or with the possibility of review after twenty-five 
years of good behavior), litigants should focus on the requirement of 
individualized assessment emphasized in Miller. 
C. Social Science Research 
What constitutes a proper juvenile disposition should not be 
determined lightly. The most important social science research will 
continue to look into the effects of registration on the registrant, the 
registrant’s whole family, and the community at large in order to show 
that the effect—if not the intent—of juvenile sex offender registration 
schemes is punitive. 
As advocates frame discussions with legislators, judges, and the 
public, they should let each advocacy area inform the others: the most 
current social science research, case law, and national trends should be 
presented to legislators; social science research, legislation, and national 
trends should be presented to courts; social scientists should track court-
based trends. As with other areas of juvenile law, this area is changing 
rapidly as we become more aware of how children and teens grow and 
change. Knowledgeable advocates can help shape the conversation and 
try to ensure that we are moving toward policies and practices that are 
cognizant and respectful of youth development. 
Conclusion 
The same analysis that the Supreme Court applied to juvenile death 
penalty and life-without-parole cases should be applied when assessing 
whether a juvenile should be required to register as a sex offender for life 
without the possibility for meaningful review. Because mandatory 
lifetime registration, community notification, and other sex offender 
 
 442. 967 N.E.2d 729, 738–39 (Ohio 2012). 
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restrictions impose ongoing and excessive punishment, the practice of 
imposing these requirements on juveniles should be abolished. 
